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Chapter 1; Introduction 
By its very nature, the St. Lawrence Seaway project, 
completed in 1959, can be seen as the last of the great 
Canadian mega-projects. An international venture, involving 
the expense of millions of dollars and employment of thousands 
of Canadians and Americans, it effectively changed the course 
of the St Lawrence river: sections of the river were deepened, 
others by-passed, while still others flooded, all the name of 
making this river, connecting the great Lakes with the ocean, 
navigable to ocean-going vessels. For the Canadian 
government, the primary motivation in the Seaway's improvement 
was the country's continued economic growth. In theoretical 
terms, the new seaway would open Canada's burgeoning 
industrial heartland, huddled along the northern shore of the 
St. Lawrence river and the lower Great Lakes, to international 
shipping, thereby reducing the costs of shipping and 
increasing Canada's access to markets. This was also 
important for the country's grain and iron ore industries, for 
whom it meant the removal of millions of dollars per year in 
transhipment costs. Anticipating the further growth of 
industry in the region, the decision to take advantage of 
changes in the river's course for the production of hydro- 
electric power only sweetened the benefits of the entire 
project for Canada. 
Projects like this one were not new in Canada. Unlike 
the majority of other industrialized countries, such as the 
United States and Great Britain, which had left much of the 
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construction of their transportation networks to private 
enterprise, the governments of Canada had taken an active role 
in the improvement of trade routes as part of their economic 
policy. There simply was not enough indigenous funds or 
markets in the country to develop these projects without 
government help.** The classic example of this was the role 
the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) played 
in the national policies of the Macdonald Conservatives: the 
ribbon of railway was meant to tie the regions together by re- 
enforcing the existing trade routes and also encourage the 
growth of domestic manufacturing through the opening of 
western markets.^ 
Similarly, the St. Lawrence Seaway project was to have an 
equally important impact on the Canadian economy as it 
continued to evolve. One of the major motivating factors 
influencing the east-west trading axis and the construction of 
the CPR at the turn of the century was the importance played 
by Britain in the Canadian economy. Prior to the Second 
World War, the mother country had been the Canada's largest 
overseas trading partner, consuming a large portion of its raw 
^ Thomas F. Mcllwraith, "Freight Capacity and Utilization of 
the Erie and Great Lakes Canals Before 1850" in The Journal of 
Economic History, vol.XXXVI #4, p.869. 
^ Gerald Tulchinsky's book on the Montreal merchants of the 
nineteenth century paints a similar picture. According to 
Tulchinsky, the provincial government played an extremely important 
role in the continued growth of the city through support of 
transportation improvements. Gerald Tulchinsky, The River Barons: 
Montreal Businessmen and the Growth of Industry and Transportation, 
1837-53. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p.232. 
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materials, food stuffs and manufactured goods. However, this 
was to change in the new realities of the post-war period. 
The ruination of Europe, the emergence of the Americans as a 
dominant world power and the threat of communism all played a 
part in a shift of Canada's trading axis south as the United 
States supplanted Britain as a consumer of Canadian goods. 
The building of the St. Lawrence Seaway acted to re-enforce 
this shift in trading axis, facilitating the flow of raw 
materials south, especially iron ore. For the seemingly 
insatiable appetite of the blast furnaces of the US midwest, 
Canadian raw materials became invaluable for continued 
American growth, while Canada increasingly became dependent on 
the capital of its southern neighbour for its own development. 
For the Canadian Lakehead, centre of the resource rich 
region of Northwestern Ontario and second largest port by 
volume in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence system, it would seem 
natural that the success of the Seaway project would have long 
term benefits. From their establishment the twin communities 
on the northwest shore of Lake Superior, Port Arthur and Fort 
William, owed much of their existence and prosperity to the 
role their harbour played in the national transportation 
f 
network. They became a gateway for people and goods moving 
between eastern and western Canada. The vast majority of all 
goods and people that travelled to and from eastern and 
4 
western Canada had to pass through the Lakehead.^ This being 
the case, then surely any improvement to the national 
transportation network would have a positive effect on these 
two communities. 
As these two communities entered the 1960's, they began 
a decade that would hold both a great promise and immense 
challenge for them. The recession at the end of the previous 
decade had revealed to local leaders that their economy 
suffered from some fundamental weaknesses, due mainly to a 
lack of industrial diversification. By that time, much of 
the regional industrial growth had become increasingly centred 
in one sector of the economy, the forest products industry, 
while other important areas, specifically secondary 
manufacturing, seemed to be in an irreversible decline. 
Without the cushion of a diverse economy, the recession in the 
forest industry had meant a large percentage of area's 
workforce found itself out of work, albeit temporarily, 
gravely effecting the communities' entire economy. It is 
small wonder that community leaders were eager for the 
completion of the Seaway project: for them, the prospect of 
becoming a seaport and major distribution centre carried with 
it the hope for a revitalized economy. Many were certain 
^ The work of J.M.S. Careless suggests that the role the 
Lakehead fulfills within the national transportation network is 
that of a "secondary" metropolis, supplying goods and services to 
its own hinterland, while at the same time playing a part in a 
larger hinterland. Cf. J.M.S. Careless, Frontier and Metropolis; 
Regions, Cities and Identies in Canada before 1914. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1989). 
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that the improved transportation network, decreased transport 
costs and their central location between east and west, would 
make the twin cities attractive to new investors and industry. 
Just how successful the residents of Port Arthur and Fort 
William were in the realization of their hopes from the 
completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway is somewhat open to 
conjecture. Based on the surface evidence, it might be easy 
to suggest that the first decade of the Seaway's use was a 
prosperous one for the Lakehead region. The cargo statistics 
from the period reveal that the volume of traffic passing 
through the port increased at a significant rate, in turn 
increasing the demand for new, more efficient facilities. 
This changed the very face of the harbour front as new 
terminals were built either replacing or supplementing 
existing facilities. These physical changes were paralleled 
by a growth in the communities themselves; growth in the 
population, new school construction, new jobs creation, the 
establishment of a university and, eventually, a merger of the 
two cities into a bustling regional centre. 
There is a problem with this view however. While it is 
true that these communities indeed experienced a certain 
amount of growth during the 1960's, there was also evidence to 
suggest that their economy was not as healthy as it might 
first appear. Relatively high seasonal unemployment rates 
during this period, a topic which stimulated no small amount 
of concern at the time, perhaps tops the list. Then there 
6 
were the requests to the federal government by business 
leaders to have the area designated a depressed region, 
eligible for government grants. This was hardly the type of 
request expected from a prosperous area. The fact is, 
analysis of the Lakehead's industrial growth during the decade 
of the 1960's reveals that it was below the national average, 
and well below that of the rest of Ontario. 
How then can this seemingly contradictory evidence be 
interpreted? Unfortunately, this is not easily answered. 
At the moment, there is little academic research available 
that could clarify the Lakehead's economic situation during 
this period. For the most part, historical research into the 
region's development has been confined to certain specific 
areas of study, the most extensive having been in the study of 
the history of the fur trade and the Northwest Company. While 
much of this and other research has added to the understanding 
of some specific aspects or cultural groups in Thunder Bay's 
history, its relatively narrow focus has meant that a complete 
picture of the local economy is not available. Without the 
proper understanding of the uniqueness of this economy, a full 
understanding of the impact of the St. Lawrence Seaway project 
is not possible. 
The Historiocrraphv 
To date there are some works, published and unpublished 
which can offer some help in understanding the history of the 
7 
Lakehead's development. From the community's establishment 
at the turn of the nineteenth century by the Northwest 
Company, it was the area's role as a transhipment point for 
goods moving east and west through the continent that was the 
driving force of its development. Harold Innis, in his 
landmark study of the fur trade in Canadian economic history, 
documented the significance that this transhipment point had 
in the success of the Northwest Company. While the focus of 
Innis' interest was the institution of the Rendezvous and not 
necessarily its location, his work reflects the importance of 
Fort William as the centre of this annual event at its peak.^ 
It was at this annual meeting that the Company partners and 
managers planned strategies for the coming year. It was also 
the seizure of the Fort by the Hudson's Bay Company in 1816, 
that dealt the death blow to the interests of the Montreal 
traders and led to their eventual merger with their former 
rival. 
The merger of the two giant fur trade companies in 1821 
spelled the end of Fort William's importance as a fur trade 
centre and nearly led to its disappearance. According to 
Elizabeth Arthur, Fort William's continued existence as a fur 
trade post hinged more on the Hudson's Bay Company's lethargic 
efforts at reorganization than any real worth the Fort had in 
^ Harold Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada; An Introduction to 
Canadian Economic History. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1956) . 
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the company's organization.^ Beginning in the early 1860's, 
discussions over Fort William's eventual closure lasted over 
15 years before a final decision was made. Had it not been 
for the Red River Rebellion in 1869, Arthur writes, the 
community surrounding the fort would have probably disappeared 
along with the Fort. The incident at Red River and the 
American refusal to allow Canadian troops to pass through 
their territory made the federal government realise that their 
proposed rail connection between the east and west coasts must 
be an all-Canadian route. This virtually guaranteed that the 
Lakehead would become, as she referred to it, a "zone of 
transit" between east and west.^ 
Just how much of a guarantee this was is open to debate. 
While the desire for an all-Canadian rail connection did exist 
there was no firm idea of what route it would take. It is 
possible, for example, that the route may have by-passed the 
Lakehead all together and followed a route similar to that of 
the National Transcontinental, built during the next century. 
The decision of what route should be followed was not an easy 
one. There were as many experts opposed to the line passing 
through this region as there were who favoured it. In this 
way Fort William owed as much to the government of Prime 
Minister Alexander Mackenzie, whose plans included a partial 
^ Elizabeth Arthur, Thunder Bay District; 1821-1892. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1973). 
^ Ibid., p.li 
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water link between east and west with the fort as a rail 
terminus, as it did to the events surrounding Red River. 
While the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway 
through the region was important to the future of the 
Lakehead, it was not the sole event affecting the area's 
development. Primarily a collection of documents concerning 
the region, Dr. Arthur's work fills an important gap in our 
knowledge of the period between the end of the Northwest 
Company and the coming of the grain trade at the turn of the 
century. It was at this time that eastern Canada's former 
perception of the Northwest as desolate land of rock and trees 
was replaced by an interest in its wealth of minerals and 
forest products . This led to a boom in both mining and land 
speculation and is responsible to the establishment of the 
second community on Thunder Bay, Port Arthur. 
The wheat boom that followed on the heals of the 
completion of the CPR is known to have had a major effect on 
the evolution of the national economy. While the 
significance of this boom on the life of the two communities 
is generally acknowledged, there has been little formal 
research in to the specifics of its effects. Just how much 
of a role the harbour played in the economic life of the area 
is not known. What studies there have been done on the 
harbour have concerned its growth and efficiency. One such 
illuminating study has been the 1981 graduate thesis of 
Patricio Larrain from the Department of Geography at the 
10 
University of Regina.^ Analyzing the commodity flow through 
the port of Thunder Bay between 1961 and 1979, Larrain 
attempted to identify the main factors influencing their 
movement, with special emphasis being placed on the spatial 
and temporal variations that occurred during that period. 
While primarily a geographic study, using an analytical 
model to measure and interpret the commodity flow statistics 
and changes in the harbour, Larrain used some of his research 
to place the fluctuations of commodity movement into a 
historical context, making his one of the few attempts to 
analyze events affecting the communities. Through this 
analysis, Larrain develops a general picture of the 
communities, their employment patterns and industries, with an 
emphasis being place on their interaction with the harbour. 
Of course, the main focus of the study is how the flow of 
goods was affected by specific events, such as climatic 
fluctuations. 
From this study some important trends concerning Thunder 
Bay harbour are revealed. Larrain classified the various 
commodities passing through the harbour into three types based 
on their destination. The standard designations for shipping 
traffic, coastwise and international shipping, are 
supplemented by another classification, which is actually a 
subsection of the international classifier, reflecting the 
' Patricio Larrain, Port Geography of Thunder Bay: A 
Commodity Flow Analysis (Regina: Unpublished MA thesis, 1982) . 
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large amount of traffic destined specifically to U.S. Great 
Lake ports. The findings show an increasing redistribution 
of traffic. For example, while at one time Montreal was the 
principal destination for grain shipments from the Lakehead, 
by the late 1960's, a trend developed where this focus shifted 
away to other ports in the lower-St. Lawrence system. 
While Larrain's study of Thunder Bay's commodity flow 
adds to the research about the Lakehead, it falls short of 
contributing to an understanding of the communities 
encompassing the harbour in terms of how the increases 
affected local employment, and economic and social growth. 
As a result, the perception generated by Larrain's analysis is 
that the economic life of the Lakehead was centred around the 
harbour. For example, he states that there were three periods 
in the development of Thunder Bay, the fur trade (1679-1845) , 
the mining era (1846-1884) , and the grain era (1884-present) . 
By claiming that this latter period had "lasted for more than 
a century and ... will last for the foreseeable future", the 
rise to predominance of the forest industry in the region and 
the evolution of the service sector are ignored.® This 
perspective, however, demonstrates his fixation with the grain 
trade in which the harbour plays a vital role. 
Important to this study is Larrain's assertion that the 
opening of the Seaway had only a slight impact on the movement 
of commodities in and out of the harbour. This conclusion is 
8 Ibid, p.30. 
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based on the findings of a study done by the federal 
government, which shows that a $5.50 per ton cost saving was 
made on the movement of wheat through Seaway. Larrain 
contends that even without this saving, the freight rate for 
water transport would have been about 50 percent cheaper than 
those of rail.^ If this were the case then the grain would 
have passed through Thunder Bay with or without the Seaway. 
He concludes that since the movement of this commodity, 
accounting for 85 percent of harbour traffic, was guaranteed, 
then the existence of the Seaway would mean little to the 
future development of the harbour. What he does not take 
into account is the possibility that without the decline in 
water freight rate, the Lakehead may have lost traffic to 
either Churchill or Vancouver; the latter did not have the 
problem of a winter freeze-up to contend with and Churchill's 
was much shorter. 
It is because grain shipping lost some of its importance 
to the local economy as it matured, that the issue of the 
impact of the Seaway improvements becomes questionable. Many 
experts were certain that any decline in bulk freight rates 
would result in higher grain traffic through the Lakehead. 
However, the rapid development of the manufacturing industry 
during the 1940's and 1950's meant that the grain industry had 
become secondary in importance to the economic survival of the 
^ Ibid. p.60. 
Ibid, p . 62 . 
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Lakehead. For these industries, the cheap movement of 
construction materials and their products to markets were the 
key to both their continued survival as well as the future 
growth of the Lakehead. Their concerns, then, were over the 
impact on the movement of general cargo in which there was no 
guarantee that the Seaway would have a benefit. This study 
will show that while there was a significant impact on the 
volume of commodities through harbour, the St. Lawrence Seaway 
did not have the desired effect on the movement of general 
cargo shipments, thereby limiting the industrial growth of the 
region and the twin cities of Port Arthur and Fort William. 
Chapter 2; The Lakehead's Beginnings 
In the study of 'place' in geography, one learns that the 
formation of communities is congruent with the geographic 
attributes offered their people. Sometimes it was the basic 
need for food and the fertility of the land that attracted 
people, as with the flood plains of the Tigris and the 
Euphrates. Sometimes luxury goods were the attraction, as 
with formation of the city of Bath, England, around the hot- 
springs found there. As civilization developed and 
communities became more interdependent through trade, 
geographic location on major trade routes became equally as 
important in their formation as to what the region offered in 
raw materials. At portages around river obstructions, at the 
forks of a river or road, or at natural harbours, people were 
able to acquire both the basic and luxury requirements of life 
in trade for their produce or services. London, England is 
one such example of a city growing at a crossroads. 
If one were to search for the factors important to the 
growth of the communities of Port Arthur and Fort William, 
invariably at the top of the list would be Canada's east-west 
trade. Situated at the approximate midpoint of Canada, the 
Canadian Lakehead owes its very existence to the need for a 
national transportation network and now acts as a point of 
convergence for railways, highways and port facilities.^ 
’’ Prior to the amalgamation of the twin cities of Port Arthur 
and Fort William, the term Thunder Bay was the geographic 
designation for the natural harbour formed by the Sibley peninsula 
and the Welcome Islands. Port Arthur was situated at the north 
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Considering how important Canada's transportation system was 
to the establishment of the two communities at the Lakehead, 
it is curious to note that there has been little research into 
this system's place in the local economy. In actual fact, 
there has been little research into the local economy itself, 
research which would form a basis for the understanding of the 
economic health of the twin cities. With this in mind, this 
paper will study the growth of the local economy, in order to 
place the building of the St. Lawrence Seaway and its effects 
into the context of the Lakehead's continued development. To 
achieve this, it is important to explain the Lakehead's 
development from its early period to the end of 1950's when 
the Seaway was opened. 
The Lakehead's early period (1781-1821) was dominated by 
the activities of the Northwest Company in the region. 
Established by the Company in 1801, Fort William became its 
base for the transhipment of goods in the penetration and 
exploitation of British North America's northwest. At the 
head of one of the world's largest lake-river systems, the 
location offered a relatively safe harbour as well as a 
navigable tributary linking Lake Superior to other river 
systems in the west. As for the settlement itself, the fort 
was used only seasonally, with a population that fluctuated 
from a peak of 2 000 during the summer rendezvous, to as few as 
western edge of this harbour and Fort William around the mouth of 
the Kaministiqua River at the southern extremity. 
16 
sixteen people during the winter months. Industry was 
limited to the manufacture of iron products in the smith's 
shop, to canoe construction, items strictly for use by the 
company and not subject to trade. In other words, the 
survival of these activities was based on the continued 
existence of the fur trade company. 
With the shift of the fur-trade axis north to Hudson's 
Bay away from the Laurentian route, after the amalgamation of 
the Hudson's Bay and Northwest Companies in 1821, Fort William 
lost its trade and its importance. Largely ignored by the 
fort's new owners, the local community had to wait more than 
3 0 years for the opening of the Soo Locks in 1855, which 
allowed the passage of ships between Lakes Superior and Huron, 
before it would experience any significant economic growth.^ 
This improved water connection between the two lakes injected 
new life into the community. Claims made about the mineral 
wealth of the region were investigated and a small timber 
industry was established. Most importantly for the 
community, however, was that it represented a new interest in 
western penetration. 
Even after the reputation of the Northwest Company in the 
region had faded away, the area around Fort William continued 
to play a role in the movement of people between the Canada's 
and the Northwest. For this purpose. Fort William continued 
to stock the giant north canoes, the same design used by the 
2 Arthur, Op_cit., p.xxxv. 
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fur traders to move their goods east and west a generation 
before. In 1867, the increasing need for an improved 
connection between this area west led to an attempt at road 
construction between Thunder Bay, just north of the Hudson's 
Bay post, and the Red River colony. The site chosen as the 
road's starting point by Simon Dawson, the civil engineer 
leading the project, also became the site of the second 
community in the area. Prince Arthur's Landing. The Dawson 
Road, named for its builder, did not reach the Red River 
settlement but instead became a route for the transportation 
of supplies for local mining areas.^ 
It was the construction of the CPR in 1882 that firmly 
placed the Lakehead within the framework of the nation as a 
link between east and west. The Lakehead was not in any way 
guaranteed to be chosen the site of a water terminus for the 
new transcontinental railway. During the planning stages for 
the construction of the Canada-Pacific Railway in the early 
1870's, the developers actively considered a site at Red Rock 
near the mouth of the Nipigon River, and Thunder Bay.^ The 
selection hinged very much on which site offered the better 
harbour facilities. The communities themselves were about 
^ Ibid, p.lxxxviii. 
^ The Canada-Pacific Railway refers to the initial 
unsuccessful attempt by the Canadian government to establish a 
railway penetrating its Northwest territories. The Canadian 
Pacific Railway (C.P.R.) refers to the second and successful 
attempt at railroad construction by a government funded railway 
syndicate established in 1881. 
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equal in size and features;^ both were Hudson's Bay Company 
posts and had roughly the similar populations.^ 
The importance of the choice of Fort William as a 
terminus for the Canada-Pacific Railway in 1874 and the 
construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (C.P.R.) in 1881 
cannot be understated. The year 1881 saw the opening of the 
CPR; in 1882 the first recorded shipment of grain was loaded 
by wheelbarrow at the Lakehead and in the following year, the 
first grain elevator was constructed in Port Arthur. This 
network established the trade and economic foundation for the 
region which survives today. The construction of the rail 
system was an integral part of the Canadian government's 
national policies for economic growth which relied on the 
development of a western market for Canadian manufacturers as 
well as a bread basket to feed the country. It was to this 
national policy that the Lakehead found itself willingly tied. 
The opening of the Canadian west and its economic impact 
on the future of Canadian society is well documented and 
^ Cf. "The Petition of the Municipality of Shuniah: The 
Question of the Terminus of the Branch of the Pacific Railway North 
Shore of Superior, 1874" in Elizabeth Arthur, Op cit.. p.l78. 
Robert Crawford, Answer to the Pamphlet entitled "The Question of 
the Terminus" of the Branch of the Pacific Railway on the North 
Shore of Lake Superior. (Collingwood: John Hogg, 1874). 
^ The populations of the two areas were approximately the same 
in 1870-71: Nipigon with 438 people and Kaministiquia with about 
503. Canada, Census of Canada 1870-71., p.30. However, those 
figures changed drastically only ten years later, theoretically 
caused by the prospects of a completed terminus at Fort William. 
Nipigon grew to 512 people while the Lakehead exploded to a 
population of 1,965 inhabitants. Canada, Census Of Canada 1880-81., 
p. 90 . 
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controversial. To Harold Innis, it was another example of 
Canada's dependence on staples for its economic development 
which latter was to result in unbalanced growth. For J.M.S. 
Careless, the exploitation of the west explains the growth of 
the Canadian city, representing the hinterland in his 
metropolitan view of history. For the development of the 
Prairies, W.L. Morton believes the main determinant has been 
its integration with the national economy, or metropolitan 
system. The greatest controversy over the interpretation of 
this period appears to come from the economic historians. 
Traditionally the "wheat boom", the period from 1901-1911 is 
considered to have supplied a major impetus to Canadian 
economic development. This has been challenged by Edward J. 
Chambers and Donald F. Gordon, who claim that the export of 
wheat contributed at most only an 8.4 percent increase of the 
23 percent increase in per capita income experienced during 
this period.^ Gordon W. Bertram, on the other hand, 
disagrees with their conclusion. Instead, he argues that the 
wheat boom contributed about 25 percent of this per capita 
increase.® 
Regardless of the impact that the wheat boom had on the 
national economy, its influence was far greater regionally. 
^ Edward J. Chambers and Donald F. Gordon, "Primary Products 
and Economic Growth: An Empirical Measurement", in Perspectives of 
Canadian Economic History. Douglas McCalla ed. (Toronto: Copp Clark 
Pitman Ltd., 1987), p.213. 
® Gordon W. Bertram, "The Relevance of the Wheat Boom in 
Canadian Economic Growth." in Ibid., p.236. 
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On the prairies, for example, where grain production was the 
centre of the economy, the benefits for its population would 
be significant. The same can be said for the impact of the 
wheat boom on the Lakehead. In fact the development of the 
grain trade can be considered part of and a major stimulant to 
what may be known as the Lakehead's 'period of development' 
between 1900 and 1927. This was an era of rapid industrial 
development and population growth. It is also symbolised by 
the spirit of enthusiasm and rivalry felt by the two 
communities. 
This vigorous development in the Lakehead, stimulated 
initially by the wheat boom, can be seen by the construction 
of four grain elevators along the Kaministiquia River by the 
CPR in 1900, bringing the local total to five. The area's 
importance as a transportation centre was secured when first, 
the Canadian Northern Railway in 1901, and then, the Grand 
Trunk Pacific Railway in 1905, followed the CPR's example by 
establishing grain termini at the Lakehead. This influx of 
investment and jobs into the region did much to stimulate 
growth. Between 1903 and 1913, the number of industries 
located there grew an astonishing 375 percent, from 15 to 71 
companies. While much of this expansion can be attributed to 
the grain trade, companies like Canadian Car and Foundry, 
which began production in 1912, started its corporate life 
building and repairing rolling stock for the Canadian 
government. The importance of this period of development is 
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further highlighted when one considers that four of the 
companies established during this time. Port Arthur 
shipbuilding and Drydock, Ogilvie Flour Mill, N.M. Paterson 
and Son, and Canadian Car and Foundry continued to be major 
employers in the Lakehead well into the 1960's.^ 
With the establishment of the grain trade in the region, 
the skyline of the twin cities was irrevocably changed. 
Starting with one elevator in Port Arthur in 1883, there were 
five by the turn of the century with a capacity of 7,500,000 
bushels. By 1913, the Port Arthur Board of Trade was 
announcing that its grain trade had increased 1400 per cent 
over the past ten years. By 1922, Port Arthur and Fort 
William had the largest grain capacity in the world. The 
fifteen elevators in each city gave the Lakehead a storage 
capacity of 92,730,000 bushels. In addition, the movement 
of grain east was counter-balanced by the establishment of 
coal docks in both cities. Coal travelled west from the 
ports of Lake Erie both as cargo and as ballast for the grain 
’ The Lakehead Chamber of Commerce and The Canadian Lakehead 
Industrial Commission Inc., The Canadian Lakehead. (Fort William), 
p.6. 
The figures supplied show that in 1902, 3,693,689 bushels 
of grain passed through Port Arthur and 27,752,899 bushels through 
Fort William. By 1912 this number had increased to 49,861,143 
bushels and 97,238,531 bushels, or 1400% and 400% through Port 
Arthur and Fort William respectively. Port Arthur Board of Trade, 
Bulletin. (Port Arthur: Daily News, 1913) Vol.l, no.23. Aug. 5 
1913. Whelan Collection. 
Henderson Directory; Twin Cities Fort William and Port 
Arthur. Vol.XV 1935, p.l9. 
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carriers. It was then transhipped at the Lakehead for storage 
or direct use by the railway companies. 
During the 1920's other changes were taking place on the 
harbour fronts. Many of grain elevators built during the 
wheat boom were of wood slat construction held together by 
metal bands. Because of their weak construction, many had to 
be replaced or were destroyed. Throughout the 1920's, 
various projects were established to either replace existing 
wood structures with concrete ones or to increase the capacity 
of existing ones. As a result, between 1920 and 1930, 
twenty-three projects were initiated accounting for the 
addition of 39,487,000 bushels of new elevator capacity. 
This brought the total capacity of the Lakehead elevators down 
to 88,867,000 bushels but placed them on a more permanent 
footing. Many of these elevators remained the same through 
to the 1960's with only minor changes to them during the 
intervening period. 
To the harbour itself, the development in front of Port 
Arthur was somewhat more pronounced than Fort William. 
Whereas all of the development in Fort William lined the 
dredged Kaministiquia and Mission rivers, the harbour of Port 
Arthur needed to be dredged and a break-wall built. The 
first break-wall, 4150 feet of timber cribwork, was 
Paterson Library Archives, Phillips Collection, MG-26 C-52. 
J.E. Young, Historical Fact Grain Elevator Construction and 
Shipping Lakehead Harbour 1883-1964. (Lakehead Harbour Commission, 
february 19 65) . 
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constructed in 1883. By 1930, the break-wall extended to 
enclose 5 1/2 miles of shoreline and was in the process of 
conversion to crushed rock.^^ The physical changes to Fort 
William harbour were less noticeable but just as significant. 
In 1909, The Great Lakes Dredging Company out of Port Arthur, 
partly owned by James Whalen, a local entrepreneur, was 
"indentured" for the dredging of both the Kaministiquia and 
Mission Rivers in Fort William to a depth of 22 feet. In 
1911, the contract was extended to include the McKellar river, 
for a total of 13 miles of navigable waterway with three 
turning basins for the ships. It was estimated in 1930 that 
there were 22 miles of potential frontage for wharves and 
docking berths. 
This development of the waterfronts of the twin-cities 
continued, not only as maintenance projects, but as new 
demands were placed on the transportation network and the 
communities. For example, further improvements were made in 
the mid-thirties, maintaining the harbour depth of twenty-two 
feet and an extension of the Port Arthur break-wall. The 
traffic through the harbour was up over recent years, but not 
From a paper presented by A.A. Anderson, engineer Department 
of Public Works to Thunder Bay Historical Society, 1930. in Thunder 
Bay Historical Museum Society, Papers and Records.. Vol. XI, 
(1983), pp.43-44. 
Paterson Library Archives, Lakehead University, Whelan 
Collection, MG-6. Contract between Dominion of Canada and Great 
Lakes Dredging Co. Ltd., 11 Dec. 1909, pp.1-2. 
Anderson, OP cit. . p.47. 
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over pre-depression levels. The government's motive for this 
project appears to have been directed more towards improving 
the local employment situation, than releaving pressure on the 
harbour's facilities. 
The fantastic development of the harbour fronts and 
industries of the two cities brought with them the trappings 
of the modern city. During the first decade of the twentieth 
century the populations of the two communities more than 
doubled. Fort William grew from 3,997 people in 1901 to 
16,499 in 1911, an increase of 354 percent, while Port Arthur 
increased to 11,220 people from 3,214 during the same period, 
a 249 percent increase. Sewer and water systems, electric 
lights, paved streets, theatres and cinemas and the first 
municipally funded and built electric street car system in 
North America made the twin cities an island of civilization 
in a sea of forest. With this new found prosperity it is not 
hard to imagine the enthusiasm of local residents, an 
enthusiasm and excitement that led to an intense rivalry 
between the two neighbours. 
By the 1920's the development that the Lakehead had 
experienced, sparked strictly by the transportation 
revolution, began to wane. The transportation industry was 
now established and no longer served as a market for some of 
these companies forcing them either to close or to diversify. 
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of 1911. 
(Ottawa: Office of His Majesty's Printer, 1911), pp.539-540. 
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The history of the Canada-Car plant, illustrates this. With 
the disappearance of government contracts for rolling stock it 
sought more diverse business contracts, like building ships 
for the French government. Even so, the plant was closed in 
1922. Fort William's statistics show that the area likely 
experienced a transition in its employment pattern. Table 2.1 
Table 2.1--Number of persons employed in key industries 
in Fort William in 1911 and 1921 
Industries Manufacturing Services Transportation 
Census years 
1911 1067 1406 2565 
1921 1339 1505 2425 
Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Censuses of Canada. 
Note: Figures are only available for Fort William before 1931. 
Assuming the similarity between the two cities the percentages 
should represent both communities. 
reveals that there had been an increase in the number of 
/ 
people employed in manufacturing and services industries 
between 1911 and 1921, manufacturing representing the largest 
of the two with and increase of almost twenty percent. The 
transportation field on the otherhand experienced an 
approximate drop of five percent in its number employees. 
Owing to the population size of Port Arthur in 1911, its 
employment statistics were not published by the Dominion Bureau of 
Statistics. Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of 
Canada 1911. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1911). Canada, Dominion 
Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada, 1921. (Ottawa: King's 
Printer, 1921). 
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As one can see from these figures, industrial development 
at the Lakehead did not stop because the market in the 
transportation industry was no longer expanding. The 
existence of the transportation network and the changes that 
it had wrought became the incentive for industry to locate at 
the twin cities. In short, the establishment of the Canadian 
Lakehead as a major transportation link brought markets and 
supply sources closer, making the cost of transportation for 
local industry cheaper. 
The second major stage of the Lakehead's development 
occurred in the latter part of the period. Much of the 
communities' economy was based on resource exploitation. 
Even though the mining and timber industries had been in 
existence in the region well before the advent of the CPR, 
the penetration of the railways into the interior had helped 
to stimulate growth somewhat in these industries. It acted 
both as a source of supply, to work camps and as a means of 
extraction of the raw materials. 
Despite the important role this played in the development 
of these concerns, it was the intangible contribution of 
nationalism that acted as the major stimulant to this sector 
of the economy, especially in the forest products field. 
Developing out of a tariff war with the United States over the 
supply of sawlogs, the Ontario provincial government 
instituted restrictive legislation, known as the manufacturing 
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condition, meant to prohibit the export of unprocessed 
woodJ® Important to the Lakehead was the extension of this 
legislation from sawlogs to pulpwood in 1900 This act, 
combined with the US decision to eliminate the tariff on 
newsprint in October 3 1913, opened the door for the 
establishment of what would become the largest single 
industrial employer in the region, the pulp and paper 
industry. The first of these mills was erected in 1918 by 
James Whalen for the production of wood pulp for eastern 
markets. Two other mills were to follow during the next six 
20 years. 
By 1927, the foundations of the Lakehead's economy had 
been set. The almost frantic expansion that had characterised 
the first three decades of the twentieth century had reached 
a peak and begun to stabilise. The importance of this period 
was the opening of the rail link with the prairies and tying 
the Lakehead into the national transportation network. It not 
only meant a link to the Prairie economy but allowed the 
Lakehead to profit from its central location in a resource- 
Cf. H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests. Mines 
and Hvdro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941. (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1974) . 
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Pulp and Paper 
Industry 1934. (Ottawa, Kings's Printer, 1936), p.8. 
By 1924 three of the eventual four mills at the Lakehead had 
started production. The last one opened three years later. By 
the 1960's there are ten pulp and paper mills in operation in the 
Thunder Bay District, four of which are located at the Lakehead. 
Ontario Government, A History of Port Arthur Forest District: 
District History Series #4. (Toronto: Department of Lands and 
Forests, 1963). 
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rich region where it acted as a sub-metropolis. This, it 
could be argued, led to a certain amount of economic stability 
for the Lakehead, at least in the short term. 
As with the rest of Canada the twin cities of Port Arthur 
and Fort William were greatly affected by the world events of 
the 1930's and 1940's. The depression shook the very 
foundation of the local economy but did not destroy it. 
Perhaps it can be said that the role the two cities played in 
the transportation network was the great stabilizing factor 
for its economy. Through out the entire period, as other 
industries were faltering, cargo continued to move through the 
ports, though in some years at a below average level. 
Generally speaking the registered tonnage entering the two 
harbours remained constant throughout the decade. The only 
major fluctuations in cargo movement occurred for departures 
destined for local points in the three years between 1933-35. 
Coastwise shipping was relatively unaffected.^’’ Any decline 
in the volume in cargo must also have been felt throughout the 
country. The Lakehead's harbour statistics for 1933, the 
lowest volume recorded for this period, still placed the it as 
the second largest port in Canada after Montreal in registered 
tonnage moved. 
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Shipping Report. 
1928-1936. 
"Seven Million Tons of Shipping Arrive, Leave Harbours in 
One Season" in Fort William Daily Times Journal. 19 December 1936. 
29 
While the transportation industry may have been fairly 
stable, other sectors were not so lucky. If the census year 
of 1931 can be used as a gauge for the entire period, then the 
transportation, communication and storage industries offered 
Ontario's workers better job security than did manufacturing. 
While in 1931, 18 percent of the people employed in 
manufacturing were out of work, only 11 percent of the 
employees from the transport industry were idle in Ontario. 
One of these manufacturers, the pulp and paper industry owed 
much of its financial troubles to declining demand and 
exports. Prior to the 1929 stock market crash, the paper 
industry was one of Canada's fastest growing industries. 
Except for one year, 1921, it boasted regular annual growth 
reaching a peak profit of $243,970,761 in 1929. By 1933, four 
years later, profits were cut almost in half to 
$123,415,492.^^ Locally that translated into shut downs and 
lay offs; 300 men in the Abitibi Mission Island Mill alone. 
By 1934, all four of the local paper mills were in 
receivership. 
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada. 
1931. vol.6 (Ottawa: Kings Printer, 1932), Table 13. 
The Pulp and Paper Industry 1934. p.7. 
"Newsprint Industry Firmly Established in Lakehead Cities" 
in Fort William Daily Times-Journal. 10 December 1932. Mill 
workers were not the only people effected by such shut downs. For 
every person employed in the mills there was at least one man 
employed in the forests to harvest the trees. 
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Despite the economic hardship experienced at the 
Lakehead, there was continued growth, however slight The 
mid-thirties saw further improvement of the harbour facilities 
and work on a trans-Canada highway had begun. In 
addition, the Lakehead celebrated the establishment of three 
major employers^^ two of which were lumber and timber firms. 
Northern Wood Preservers and Great West Timber, both in Port 
Arthur. Also, in 1937, Canada Car started production again 
after almost a decade of silence, building bi-wing training 
aircraft for the Royal Air Force and then Grumman fighters for 
the Turkish government.^® This reopening is significant as 
a precursor of a new period of development at the Lakehead and 
the herald that the world was preparing for war. 
The years 1939-1945 were prosperous for the Lakehead. At 
the centre of a vast and resource rich region, it benefited 
greatly as a source of supply for the Allied forces. In 
This was primarily a make work project, only lasting the 
depression. The Trans-Canada highway through Northwestern Ontario 
was not completed until 1960. 
Commencing in 1936, the Federal government improved the 
harbour depth of both Port Arthur and Fort William to 25 feet from 
22. In addition it commissioned the construction of a new 
pierhead at he east end of Mission Island as well as 1200 feet of 
break-wall in front of Port Arthur linking the Bearpoint breakwater 
completed in 193 0 with the harbour's old wall. Fort William Times 
Journal. 14 December, 1935 
^®This was an important change for the plant, though not 
unusual. During the first world war. Can-car was commissioned to 
construct for the French Government, eleven frigates for its navy. 
As the Grain market began to stabilize the company could no longer 
rely on government contracts for the production of rolling stock. 
In order to remain open, Can-Car was placed in a position that it 
had to be flexible and able to build a variety of types of items. 
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addition, many local industries were refitted for war time 
production. With the declaration of war, Can-Car received 
the contract for the Hawker "Hurricane” for the RCAF and then 
in 1942 began construction of the Curtiss "Helldiver" for the 
U.S Navy. In total, the local Can-Car plant produced 1451 
"Hurricanes" and 894 "Helldivers" and employed more than 7,000 
people, half of whom were women. 
Even though the Port Arthur Shipbuilding Company could 
not boast 7,000 employees, its contribution was no less 
substantial. It built twenty-three Algerine and Bangor type 
minesweepers and nine corvettes for the Royal Canadian Navy, 
used in the protection of the North Atlantic convoy route. 
It also continued work on ship repair and even repaired 
aircraft fuselages.In its highest year of productivity, 
1944, the plant employed 2,150 men.^^ Both Can-Car and the 
shipbuilding company were joined in the war effort by such 
companies as NESCO, a small local engineering and machining 
firm established in 1906. During the Second World War it 
supplied 14" shells for the British Army. 
The end of the war meant retooling for peace. The 
Lakehead experienced many of the same events that other 
Canadian cities did as life returned to normal. For 
UTDC, Can Car Thunder Bay Works- 1912-1990. 
30 IIPort Arthur Plant Building Ships" in Fort William Daily 
Times Journal. 20 December, 1941. 
Phillips collection, MG6 A-83. A promotional pamphlet for 
the Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co. March 1966. 
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companies like Can-Car, it 'meant the manufacturing of non- 
military products such as gas and diesel buses for various 
cities throughout North America. This company alone supplied 
the Lakehead with about a thousand new jobs. In the resource 
industries, a growth in investment and the ability to use 
Marshall Plan funds in Canada led to a period of growth in 
Northwestern Ontario that was to last well into the 1960's. 
Of major importance for the region, was the establishment of 
the Steep Rock iron mines at Atikokan, just west of the twin 
cities. The opening of the mine coincided with the end of 
the war and the demobilization of the Canadian troops 
overseas. The demands of reconstruction replaced those of 
war and it was expected that the mine would produce over a 
million tons of iron ore per year all of which would be sent 
through the harbour at the Lakehead. Many soldiers went 
almost directly to the mine right after the cessation of 
hostilities. 
As this brief survey of the Lakehead's development 
reveals, the transportation industry, specifically that played 
by the harbour, was an integral part of the area's prosperity. 
It not only was a stimulant to growth during periods of 
economic health, but it acted also as an economic cushion for 
the communities during the depression. 
Beyond this general observation, if one looks closely at 
the development of the area, from the establishment of the CPR 
and grain terminals to the end of the Second World War, a 
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downward trend in the influence of the transportation industry 
on the local economy can be seen. In actual fact, much of 
this sector's influence on the cities' development is limited 
to their early years of growth where it was the major 
stimulant. Once established, their economy began to evolve, 
adding secondary manufacturing and resource based industry to 
the pool of employers. As reflected in the nature of the 
Lakehead's workforce, by far the largest change was to come 
during the 1940's. By 1951, manufacturing accounted for the 
largest share of employees at the Lakehead, twenty percent of 
the entire workforce. It was followed by the service 
industry at seventeen percent, transportation and 
communication at sixteen percent and forestry and logging 
accounting for fifteen percent of available workforce. 
Comparing these figures with those from 1911 or 1921, the 
scale of the Lakehead's diversification becomes clear; the 
transportation and communications industry accounted for 
thirty-three percent and manufacturing only fourteen 
percent. 
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Statistics of the 
Economic Regions of Ontario and Quebec: A Progress Report. (Ottawa: 
1956) , pp.21-22 . 
Figures are only available for Fort William for 1911. 
Employment figures for Port Arthur are available from 1931 on. 
Assuming the similarity between the two cities the percentages 
should represent both communities. For 1921 manufacturing 
accounted for eighteen percent of the work force. Canada, Dominion 
Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada. (1911 and 1921) . 
Chapter 3; The Seaway's Promice 
It is generally acknowledged that the first quarter 
century following the end of the Second World War marked 
perhaps the greatest period of economic expansion in Canada's 
history, if not the greatest in statistical terms, then in 
terms of economic diversification.Prior to the war, Canada 
had lagged behind other countries in its recovery from the 
economic devestation of the world depression. The war had 
acted as a stimulant to its economy, fuelling its industries, 
while leaving the country physically unscathed, unlike the 
shattered nations of Europe and Japan. This factor, combined 
with the infusion of millions of dollars for the development 
of manufacturing and natural resources, left Canada one of the 
seven strongest economies of the world. While the demands of 
the wartime economy disappeared with the end of conflict, 
profits made from the war, the demands of reconstruction, new 
international policy and a new sense of optimism helped Canada 
fill the economic void. Everyone was making long postponed 
investments, from the family purchasing the long awaited 
washing-machine to corporate investment in Alberta's oil 
fields. 
This trend carried into the 1950's, helped along by the 
demands placed on the world by the Korean War. During this 
Robert Bothwell et al, Canada Since 1945; Power, Politics, 
and Provincialism. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 
pp.9-25. R. Douglas Francis et al, Destinies: Canadian History 
Since Confederation. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of 
Canada, 1988), pp.307-311. 
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period Canada's GNP grew from just under $30 billion per year 
in 1945 to $50 billion by 1960.^ While impressive in itself, 
in terms of representing the maturing of the national economy, 
these figures show growth despite three periods of recession 
following the war. The first, which occurred in 1945, 
reflects the conversion to a peace-time economy; the second 
recession occurred following the end of the Korean conflict in 
1953, and the last represents the end of Canada's post-war 
boom and the resulting recession of 1957-61.^ 
To a certain extent Canada's economic experiences in the 
post-war period, both good and bad, can be attributed, to the 
close relationship between its economy and that of its 
American neighbour. Canada could not expect to remain 
unaffected by changes in the international economic order in 
the aftermath of the war. While the country had a strong 
trade relationship with the US as a net importer of goods 
\ 
prior to the Second World War, shifting trading patterns 
caused by European reconstruction resulted in a change in the 
relationship, making Canada a net exporter to the United 
States. It was the extensive American demands for raw 
materials that fired the resource boom in Canada. As a 
result, American investors were large contributors the 
development of iron ore, oil and uranium deposits north of the 
^ Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts. 
1926-1974. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1975). 
^ Ibid. 
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border. In the same way, when the recession hit the United 
States economy, it acted to restrict further investment in and 
limited imports of raw materials from Canada, thus affecting 
its economy. 
Throughout this period, the Lakehead's fortunes 
fluctuated alongside that of the country's. Just as the 
nation benefited from renewed growth in the aftermath of the 
world war, so did resource rich Northwestern Ontario. The 
boom in resource investment led such employers as the forest 
products industries to expand their operations in the twin 
cities and in the surrounding district, solidifying their role 
as the dominant sector employer. Steep Rock Iron Mines and 
Caland Iron Ore Company, children of the previous decade, 
continued to flourish as demand for iron ore in the U.S 
increased and the resources of the Mesabi range of northern 
Minnesota dwindled. The growth of such towns in the district 
had a residual impact on the Lakehead, as the regional 
metropole. The Lakehead had long been the main service centre 
for the region, augmented by the communities of Kenora and 
Dryden. 
The other two mainstays of the local economy, the Port 
Arthur Shipbuilding Company and Canadian Car, also continued 
to grow. In one sense, the two could almost be considered 
new companies. The Shipbuilding Company came under full 
control of Canadian Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited, a 
subsidiary of Canada Steamship Lines (CSL), immediately 
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following the war. This organization ran the operations of 
four of the five major inland shipbuilding companies at 
Midland, Collingwood, Kingston and Port Arthur.^ Portship, 
as the local operation became known, continued to build ships 
for the Department of National Defence, but increasingly began 
to rely on the diversity of its operation, expanding the 
number of repair contracts and taking on projects that varied 
from aircraft components to kitchen cabinets. In 1954, the 
millwork department contributed more than "a half million 
dollars worth of business", fulfilling sub-contracts for major 
construction projects in the Lakehead and surrounding 
district.^ 
Can Car followed a similar path of diversification, but 
unlike Portship, could not continue its wartime occupation of 
building fighter aircraft. This fact was a threat to the 
plant's solvency because in a very real sense the aircraft 
industry was all it had ever known. Because of the decade 
long hiatus it had experienced during the 1930's, it was not 
the same plant that had at one time produced rolling stock and 
ships. Following the war the emphasis again changed, from 
the construction of war planes, to the building of buses and 
other transportation vehicles after the war. In fact, it is 
^ The other company, Davie Shipbuilding of Levi, Quebec, was 
the largest of the five and owned also by CSL. 
^ Canada Steamship Lines Limited, no.66, 15 December 1955, 
Kingston, Marine Museum of the Great Lakes, Kingston Shipyards 
Collection. 
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the resilience and adaptability of the operation which has 
allowed the company to remain solvent until the present. 
While these industries were expanding, the transportation 
industry and the related grain industry changed little. If 
anything, it declined. The last expansion of elevator 
capacity occurred in 194 8 and there was not any further 
improvement until 1960. In terms of grain movement, the 
volume declined also. In the ten years between 1944 and 
1953, 3.3 billion bushels of grain passed through the combined 
harbours; during the following decade that total fell to 2.9 
billion bushels.^ As a result of the limited growth in this 
sector the relative importance to the communities of this 
industry declined also. Table 3.1 shows that since 1931, the 
Table 3.1--Percentage of populated employed in key industries 
at the Lakehead during census years 



























Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Censuses of Canada. 
Note: Figures are only available for Fort William before 1931. 
Assuming the similarity between the two cities the percentages 
should represent both communities. 
6 J. E. Young, Op cit., p.l2. 
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percentage of people employed in the transportation industry 
dropped significantly from its high of 33 percent in 1921. 
By 1951, it fell behind both the manufacturing and service 
industries as a source of employment to the communities: at 
that time, manufacturing accounted for the largest share of 
employees at the Lakehead, 20 percent of the entire work 
force, while the service industry accounted for 17 percent.^ 
Despite what one might assume, this period of growth and 
prosperity was not taken with complacency. The Royal 
Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects also called the 
Gordon Commission after its chairman, Walter Gordon, began 
work in 1956, just prior to the start of a lengthy national 
recession. Moreover, it was ironic that the report of the 
Gordon Commission viewed with trepidation the very fuel of the 
recent boom, foreign investment and resource exploitation. 
In one sense it can be said that the debate which ensued 
between those who, like Walter Gordon, condemned Canada's 
close economic ties with the United States and the advocates 
of such ties, led by Port Arthur's own Member of Parliament 
C.D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce and arguably the 
most powerful individual in the federal government, was simply 
semantics. Just months following the release of the 
commission's report, Canada found itself in the middle of a 
^ Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Statistics of the 
Economic Regions of Ontario and Quebec: A Progress Report. (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1956), pp.21-22. 
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recession, caused by the resource boom's end and the loss of 
accompanying capital investments, the two things which had 
formerly helped to propel Canada's expansion. As American 
markets began to tighten, inventories of Canadian resources 
began to increase, further worsening the impact of the 
economic slow-down.® 
The winding down of the resource boom and accompanying 
recession was deeply felt by Northwestern Ontario, which 
relied heavily on the resource industries and on exports to 
the United States. Perhaps hardest hit was the forest 
industry, which was affected from the manufacturers down to 
the small independant sawmills. By 1958, Hobart Styffe, 
vice-president of Oscar Styffe Limited, a local forest 
products firm, noticed a marked decrease in the number of 
contracts that his company was able to procure, amounting to 
only one-fifth (20,000 cords of wood) of what had been moved 
the year before.^ This he attributed to the stockpile of raw 
materials by his customers, who were in turn unable to move 
their products. It was his opinion that his company was not 
the only one to be affected this way, but that the whole 
® The government implies that this is a cause of the 
recession, but viewed from another reference point it could also be 
seen as an effect. Inventory build up can be caused by the loss 
of markets. National Archives of Canada, C.D. Howe Papers, MG-27 
III b-20, vol.168 file 89-3(1). O.J. Firestone, Economic Advisor, 
Department of Trade and Commerce, speaking to Vancouver Board of 
Trade. 
’ C.D. Howe Papers, MG-27 III B-20, vol.lO, 75-5-1-1. 
Styffe to C.D. Howe, 23 June 1958. 
H.H. 
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forest product sector, the largest regional employer, was 
"heading for a let-down. 
The reliance of Northwestern Ontario on the resource 
industry was beginning to generate a great amount of concern 
locally. By some reports, the region began its slow decline 
into recession as early as 1954, years before the rest of the 
country.”'”' A better description, however, would be that the 
region was experiencing stagnation in its industrial growth. 
Certainly some industries, like pulp and paper, were expanding 
their operations, but some community leaders saw the need for 
a more diversified economy to assure continued growth. The 
formation of the Northwestern Ontario Development Association 
(NODA) in 1955, to promote the region and to attract industry 
to the district, highlights this concern. Perhaps the 
largest problem for the local economy was the fact that many 
major employers such as the grain elevators and the wood-lands 
divisions of the forest industry either laid off or curtailed 
operations during the winter months. The development of new 
industry was believed to be one of the cures for this seasonal 
unemployment and a source of future stability for the cities, 
by offering year round employment to their citizens.”'^ The 
Ibid. 
”'”' Cf. Fort William-Port Arthur and District Labour Council, 
Brief concerning the Serious Unemployment Situation in the Fort 
William-Port Arthur Areas. June 1960. 
"New Real Estate Boom Predicted for Fort William" in Fort 
William Daily Times-Journal. 27 March 1956. Port Arthur Mayor 
Eunice Wishart speaking on the expected impact of the St.Lawrence 
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opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway, it was hoped, would help 
to bring on this economic stability. 
Canada's return to prosperity coincided with the return 
of the government mega-project. The last real mega-project 
had been the building of the CPR during the 1880's. Other 
projects, such as the various improvements to Canadian canals 
or the Trans-Canada highway make work projects, may well have 
been important and expensive, but lacked the breath of scale 
and did not have as decisive an economic impact. The two 
most significant projects were the building of the Trans- 
Canada Pipeline, carrying western natural gas to central 
Canadian customers and, of course, the joint venture with the 
United States, the St. Lawrence Seaway project. 
The improvement of Canada's waterways had long been a 
popular project in Canada. Ever since the completion of the 
Welland Canal system in 1848, even through Canada's early 
railway era, a period in which most countries lost interest in 
canal building, petitions were made to the federal government 
for an improvement of the waterway between the Canadian 
Seaway and the natural gas pipeline. Northwestern Ontario Brief 
presented to the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects. 
1956 . 
Sections of the Trans-Canada were completed piecemeal. 
For example a route was cut connecting the Lakehead to Winnipeg in 
1935. There was also a route going east but it zig-zagged through 
various communities. It was far easier to travel through the 
United States or to take a ferry to Sioux Ste. Marie than to take 
the highway when travelling east. The Trans-Canada highway was 
completed through Northwestern Ontario in 1960. 
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Lakehead and Montreal. Some advocated an improvement of 
existing waterways, while others supported the building of 
various routes connecting Georgian Bay directly with Lake 
Ontario or the Ottawa river. 
The communities of Port Arthur and Fort William were 
strong supporters of any move which might improve their 
connection with eastern Canada, effectively shortening the 
distance. It is also important to remember that the two 
cities had become very much linked with the prairie economy. 
Local growth was tied to policies that would have a direct 
national rather than regional impact. As a result, local 
leaders tended to ally themselves with projects beneficial to 
the nation, at least those which led to western development. 
It is not surprising therefore that people like James Conmee, 
perhaps one of Port Arthur's most controversial and 
influential figures, would speak in favour of St. Lawrence 
improvement and its resulting benefit for western Canadian 
farmers. In a paper presented before a forum on the subject, 
Conmee noted that an all Canadian route via Fort William and 
Montreal to Liverpool, with an improved St. Lawrence, was 700 
miles shorter than a similar route via the Boston-New York 
route. This speech was made six years before the wheat 
boom and the importance of prairie prosperity to the 
Lakehead's welfare was fully realized. 
International Deep Waterways Association, Proceedings of the 
First Annual Convention of the International Deep Waterways 
Association.(Toronto: Hart & Riddell, 1895), pp.441-447. 
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While much of the discussion over the St. Lawrence Seaway 
was marked by debate between special interest groups and 
nationalists, many became increasingly aware that any project 
required the financial and political assistance of the United 
States government. The Great Lakes waterway constituted much 
of the international boundary between the two countries and 
they each shared the benefits of its drainage basin. As a 
result, neither country could unilaterally change the course 
of the system without the permission of the other. The 
importance of this was accentuated by the increasing interest 
in the hydro-electric potential of the St. Lawrence River. 
Years of negotiation between the United States and Canada 
leading to the development of an international waterway along 
the Great Lakes St. Lawrence water system culminated in an 
agreement in March 1941. Converting the written agreement 
into action was not an easy task, however. This accord 
between the two neighbours did not meet with universal 
enthusiasm, with most of the opposition to the development 
based in the United States led by such large and influential 
lobby groups as the Association of American Railroads (AAR) 
and the New York Port Authority, which feared a loss of 
business. The debate was further complicated by the addition 
of groups convinced that the project must be self-supporting 
and not be a burden on the American people. Both groups 
For example; the National Committee for a Non-Subsidized 
Seaway and the New York-New Jersey Committee for a Self-supporting 
Seaway. Great Lakes Waterways Development Association, A Detailed 
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were effectively able to block the ratification of the 
agreement in Congress for a number of years, especially after 
they joined forces. The lobby interest led by the AAR, 
eventually took the position that if the project could not be 
stopped then the imposition of crippling tolls would negate 
its impact on their business. 
Canada did not experience these intrigues where there 
appeared to be little opposition to the Seaway project. What 
opposition there was concerned specifics, such as the 
imposition of tolls, rather than the promise of the project 
itself. The result was that Canada was left waiting a full 
decade for the Americans to deal with internal resistance 
before it decided to act. Throughout the intervening period 
Canada had made overtures to its southern neighbour in an 
attempt to hasten the ratification in the Senate, including a 
promise to abandon a 40 year old toll-free policy on Canadian 
canals. Even after Canada passed the Seaway Act in 1951, 
thus establishing the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority and 
Study of Serious Problems Now Confronting All Users of the 
International St. Lawrence Seaway (Montreal-Lake Ontario) and All- 
Canadian Wetland Ship Canal (Toronto: 1969), Lakehead University, 
Chancellor Paterson Archives, Phillips Collection, MG-6 n-371,- p.5. 
Lionel Chevrier, The St. Lawrence Seaway. (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1959), p.ll5. 
When after six years of debate and delays, the Truman 
administration approached the Canadian government regarding "the 
possibility of reaching agreement in principle that the Seaway be 
made self-liquidating through an agreed system of tolls". Canada 
agreed providing any benefit gained through the project would not 
be lost. Louis St. Laurent to the House of Commons, Canada, House 
of Commons Debates. 24 April, 1947, p.2354. 
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mandating the construction of the project, there was little 
encouragement that the US was going to move on the project. 
Rather, it was the Canadian threat to begin construction of an 
all-Canadian route in 1954 that stimulated the Americans into 
action. Shortly after the Canadian announcement, the US 
Congress passed the Wiley-Dondero Act ratifying the original 
1941 agreement and establishing a corporation to handle the 
project. 
Much of the rationale for the project was based on a 
Canadian and American desire to supply the demands of the 
industrial centres surrounding the Great Lakes with power and 
raw materials. With the decline of the Mesabi range in 
North-Eastern Minesota as a source for iron ore, these centres 
increasingly turned to the developing iron reserves of Sept 
Isles and Labrador to supply their iron ore needs. The 
proposed seaway development was meant to improve the movement 
of this commodity west through the St. Lawrence system. 
Incorporated into the development of an improved canal system 
were a series of hydro-electric plants meant to supply the 
needs of this region's expanding industrial base. 
Important also for Canada was the impact that new the 
Seaway would have on the movement of grain. Grain had long 
been an important export commodity for Canada, representing 
billions of dollars of trade with Europe. But in this 
international trade it competed with the Americans and 
Argentineans, and Canada's network for grain movement was 
inefficient. Prior to the opening of the improved seaway, 
the ships plying the St. Lawrence river were much smaller than 
ships in use at either end of the system. As a result, 
transshipment points were needed to enable small canal size 
vessels to traverse the 14 foot canal system. Ocean ships 
could on occasion traverse the system, but with a much reduced 
cargo. The new depth of the St. Lawrence river meant that 
ocean vessel now had access to the Upper Great Lakes and, most 
importantly to the residents of the Lakehead, access to the 
ports of Port Arthur and Fort William. Local leaders from the 
area expected that the establishment of the Lakehead as a sea 
port was one of the keys to the region's future development. 
In many ways the Lakehead was still isolated from the 
rest of Canada. The railways and the port were the life-line 
with the outside world. All goods and most people moved in 
and out of the cities mainly via these two transportation 
systems. Though started in the 1930's, the trans-Canada route 
through Northwestern Ontario was not to be completed until the 
1960's. 
The importance of transportation issues for the future 
development of the Lakehead is also evident from Northwestern 
Ontario's brief to the Gordon Commission. In general, many 
of the submissions from various business leaders listed 
problems with the availability and ultimately the cost of 
transportation as a major impediment to their development. 
One representative of the forest products industry cited the 
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combination of government policy and a small population 
located "between the Manufacturing East and the transportation 
subsidized West" translated into Northwestern Ontario having 
to support the burden of excessive transportation costs for 
its manufactured goods. Similar sentiments were reiterated 
by Robert E. Henderson, Vice-President of Manufacturing, 
Canadian Car. Of the influences governing the further 
development of secondary industry in the region, he saw the 
cheaper transportation rates of goods in and out of the 
district, as a major factor in countering the disadvantages of 
location. 
The importance of this point cannot be stressed too much. 
Being located so far away from major markets was not only a 
factor discouraging the establishment of further 
manufacturers, but was also a threat to those firms which 
already existed. Ironically, it was Robert Henderson's 
company, Can-Car, which experienced this fact first-hand. 
Part way through the fall of 1958, Can-Car's head office in 
Montreal informed the plant in Fort William that it was going 
to transfer the diesel bus and tractor trailer production from 
the Lakehead to its Dominion plant in Montreal. President 
Harwood announced that after completing an economic survey, 
the "consolidation of the company's commercial operations 
nearer its markets is essential if we are to maintain a 
Northwestern Ontario Brief Presented to the Royal Commission 
of Canada's Economic Prospects. 1956. Thunder Bay Historical 
Museum Archives. 
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competitive position for our products.While this move 
would not have closed down the plant entirely --there was some 
contract work in process, producing aircraft parts and 
aircraft repair work-- the loss of the bus and tractor trailer 
contracts, as the major chunk of the process would have been 
a serious blow to the plant and the community. It was 
Alexander Phillips' opinion that nearly 1,000 employees would 
be affected.While this figure was somewhat inflated --at 
the time of the decision, the plant was operating at 50 
percent capacity,-- it represented a significant portion of 
the local economy.^”' 
For some, the proposed seaway project held the promise of 
improving the transportation situation for the area and 
stimulating the growth of the manufacturing sector. Eunice 
Wishart, the mayor of Port Arthur, believed that the improved 
connection to outside markets would lead to the development of 
such industry as "warehousing and automotive assembly 
plantsOthers were more cautious in their expectations, 
still cognisant of the importance of the west to the region's 
Phillips Collection, MG-6 a-14(2). Alexander Phillips to 
John Diefenbaker, 18 December 1958. 
Ibid. 
Phillips Collection, MG-6, a-14(l). Brief expression grave 
concern over proposed termination and relocation of commercial and 
defence manufacturing facilities of Canadian Car Company in Fort 
William. Ontario. 1958. 
Eunice Wishart, Mayor of Port Arthur, Brief to the Royal 
Commission. 
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future prosperity. It was realized that, as with past 
development, the Lakehead's share in the success of the St. 
Lawrence Seaway "will depend largely upon growth in Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and Alberta and perhaps the Northwest 
Territories. 
In the discussion of the benefits of the St. Lawrence 
Seaway, there appears to be marked differences between 
comments made by local leaders in official documents and 
comments made to the public. Local expectations of the 
project printed in official documents such as the brief to the 
Gordon Commission are comparatively cautious in tone. Public 
uttering, on the other hand, bordered on boosterism, seen most 
vividly in the press. The production of an annual supplement 
by one of the two major regional papers, the Fort William 
Daily Times-Journal illustrated the level of optimism many 
business and political leader projected to the general public. 
These so called "Progress Edition" supplements all extolled 
the potential benefits of the two harbours becoming sea-ports 
open to ships from all nations. Characteristic titles 
included: "Harbour Committee Maps City's Role in Seaway", 
"Seaway Will Enhance Northwest's Industrial Potential", 
"Seaway, Natural Gas Will Spur Lakehead Growth Says Howe" and 
Thomas Todd, President of Fort William's Chamber of 
Commerce, Brief to the Roval Commission. 
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"Prosperity Seen With Seaway Opening". 
To a certain extent these "Progress Editions" can be 
referred to as promotional material as opposed to news. This 
can be illustrated through the contrasting coverage given to 
employment in this supplement. At the Lakehead during the 
late 1950's and early 1960's concern mounted over the growing 
number of seasonally unemployed people in the area. Where 
employment figures were announced, however, the articles refer 
only to the peak summer months when seasonal' unemployment is 
non-existent. If, in fact, this supplement was promotional 
in nature then the importance placed on the Seaway in the 
Lakehead's future industrial development is further 
highlighted. The Seaway then acts as a selling point to 
potential manufacturers to locate in the region. 
How many of these optimistic statements were believed by 
their exponents is difficult to state. Contemporary business 
and political leaders were not concerned simply with the 
actual state of the region's economy, but also with the public 
perception of their problems. In 1957, the Port Arthur 
Chamber of Commerce attempted to suppress information 
concerning local high unemployment to prevent depression in 
"25 Miles of Fort William Waterfront Being Studied: Harbour 
Committee Maps City's Role in Seaway" Fort William Daily Times- 
Journal 27 March 1956. "Seaway, Natural Gas Will Spur Lakehead 
Growth Says Howe" in Fort William Daily Times-Journal 26 March 
1957. "Seaway Will Enhance Northwest's Industrial Growth", Daily 
Times-Journal 26 March 1958. "Prosperity Seen With Seaway 
Opening" in Fort William Daily Times-Journal 24 March 1959. 
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local morale that might adversely affect business.For 3 0 
September 1957, there were 1,128 men registered for 
unemployment, up 360 percent from the previous year.^^ This 
example of the community leadership attempting to 'soften the 
blow' of difficult economic times in the minds of the general 
public may well explain the difference in tone between 
official and public statements on the future of the Lakehead 
and the impact of the seaway on its development. 
If some community leaders appeared cautious in their 
expectations, others were confident enough about the success 
of the project for the region and attempted to prepare for the 
challenge. In 1954, Great Lakes Paper embarked on a major 
expansion of its facilities adding a new paper machine and new 
ground-wood pulp equipment. The expected cost of the new 
equipment was approximately $13 million.Other than the 
usual impetus for expansion to improve one's market share, 
enthusiasm over the future prospects of the Seaway on access 
to markets played a hand in their expansion plans.In 
addition. Great Lakes' management realized that the market 
Thunder Bay Historical Museum Archives, Port Arthur Chamber 
of Commerce Collection. Minutes of the meeting of the Retail 
Merchants Executive of the Port Arthur Chamber of Commerce. (Port 
Arthur: 29 October 1957). 
Port Arthur Chamber of Commerce Collection. Minutes of the 
Meeting of the Industrial Committee. (Port Arthur: 9 October, 
1957). 
Great Lakes Paper, 1955 Annual Report, Expansion Issue 1955- 
57., p.l2. 
Ibid, p. 2 
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itself, especially the mid-west, was also destined to grow 
thanks to the potential of the Seaway. If it was simply to 
"sit tight" and not prepare for the future, then they were 
certain that the company would instead be "slipping 
backward" . 
Still others appeared to be making similar moves. As 
reported by Alexader Phillips in the Financial Post, a number 
of companies were expected to either expand their existing 
operations or add new ones, most of which were to be located 
on the harbour front. Much of this expansion was simply in 
relation to the storage of bulk materials such as petroleum 
products --Imperial Oil and Canadian Husky Oil-- or cement -■ 
St. Lawrence Cement Company and Canada Cement Company-- but 
there was some new development. Three chemical companies, 
Hurons Chemical, Mid-Canada Chemicals and Nichols Chemical 
were expected to establish plants at the Lakehead. In 
addition Canadian Malting Company planned to double the size 
of its Port Arthur plant. 
Many of the expectations for development centred around 
the movement of general cargo. Both Port Arthur and Fort 
William had harbour terminals and freight sheds; however, it 
was believed that these facilities were inadequate. The 
average volume of general cargo from 1950 to 1957 amounted to 
^ Ibid. 
Alexander Phillips, "Lakehead Ready, Willing and Able" in 
The Financial Post. 19 July, 1959. 
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approximately 350,000 tons. This figure was expected to 
increase to 1 million tons over the next decade.Plans 
were initiated for the construction of a Seaway terminal which 
integrated marshalling yards for both the CNR and CPR and 
parking areas for trucking and storage sheds in a 180 acre 
site. This was meant not only to increase the general cargo 
capacity of the harbour, but also to offer a more modern and 
efficient handling facility. 
The period from the end of the Second World War to the 
opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway represents a era of growth 
for the Lakehead but, from a development point of view, it was 
flawed growth. Certainly there was intensive expansion of 
the economy; most of the existing manufacturing establishments 
expanded their operations and the communities grew around 
them. The problem appeared to be a lack of diversity which 
robbed the region of the economic maturity and stability. 
The result was a high level of seasonal unemployment owing to 
the predominance of industries which either reduced their 
operations or closed down during the winter months. 
The announcement of the construction of the Seaway, 
effectively making the Canadian Lakehead a sea-port, offered 
to concerned citizens the possibility of economic stimulation, 
revitalizing old industries and attracting new ones. Not 
Keefer Lakehead Terminal, Canada's Mid-Continent Seaport: 
Official Opening., 23 June 1962, p.6. 
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only would foreign vessels now have access to the twin ports, 
but the distances to market would become shorter owing to the 
improved transportation network and a decrease in cost would 
be realized. It was based on these perceptions that many 
felt that renewed growth was assured. 
Chapter 4; The Business of Transportation 
It is no mean task to ascertain the impact of a single 
factor on a community's industrial development. There are 
indeed many factors that lead to a company's decision to first 
locate in a community and then to either expand or fold 
operations. Primarily, the concern is to get the maximum 
return on the investment in the community. When one is a 
primary industry involved in, for example, mineral extraction, 
then the choice of a location for the operation is limited 
since a mineral deposit can not be relocated. The question 
of plant location becomes more important for secondary 
industry. Proximity to both markets and supply sources are 
of utmost concern. Should the cost of the raw material be 
more expensive to ship than the finished product, then a 
location close to the source of the raw materials would be 
preferable. Therefore, the cost of transportation to a 
distant market or from a distant resource centre can have an 
impact on profits. 
Because of its relatively isolated position in Canada, 
the issue of distance to markets, efficiency of movement and, 
ultimately, transportation costs became important to the 
industrial development of the Lakehead. First as the major 
metropolitan centre for Northwestern Ontario, an efficient 
distribution network was needed to supply the outlying 
district then, because that district did not supply a large 
enough hinterland to fuel the Lakehead's economic development, 
it was forced export most of its production elsewhere: 
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newsprint was shipped to the eastern United States; the iron 
ore from Steep Rock moved to the steel mills surrounding the 
lower Great Lakes; and forest products, such as lumber, 
generally found their way to the United States and eastern 
Canada. This fact underlines the importance an efficient 
transportation network had for the communities. If these 
primary industries were the heart of the region, then 
transportation routes were the arteries of life to the 
markets. The Seaway improvement promised to act as a 
stimulant for growth, through improved contact, improved 
competitive standing and market share. 
The review of the Lakehead's initial period of 
development in the previous chapter revealed the extent of the 
impact a single factor, in this case a regular transportation 
connection with the rest of Canada, can have on a community. 
The growth experienced is made more impressive by the fact 
that the region, isolated as it was, had little industrial 
base to begin with. By the mid-1950's, however, the 
situation had changed; the Lakehead had a well established 
economy, one which was nationally integrated. In addition, 
the transportation industry, while important in the local 
economy, was no longer the dominant employer that it once was; 
froom roughly 30 percent of the workforce in 1911, by 1961, it 
employed less than 20 percent.^ 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada (Ottawa: The 
King's Printer, 1911). Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of 
Canada (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1961). 
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The question is, therefore, with the myriad of possible 
factors now at play in the local economy, how to measure the 
impact of the Seaway on the growth of twin cities? There are 
two closely related possibilities. In abstract terms, the 
improvement of the St.Lawrence water system should have the 
result of bringing the markets closer to the Lakehead. With 
the decrease in the cost of transportation over a given 
distance, that cost would no longer play as important a role 
in the manufacturer's decision with respect to plant location. 
Also, if the cost of transportation falls significantly enough 
in one mode of transportation, the competition must follow 
suit if it wished to remain competitive, an advantage to those 
industries unable to make use of water transport. To study 
the impact of Seaway improvements, the cost of transportation 
and the industrial expansion of the Lakehead will be studied. 
As part of this analysis, it is important to also view the 
impact rate changes had on the volume of traffic through the 
harbour and in some cases the alternate modes of transport.^ 
The resulting picture will illustrate whether in fact the 
optimism expressed by local leaders prior to the Seaway's 
completion was based more on realistic expectations or simple 
dreams for the future. 
^ As part of the changes to Canada's transportation network 
surrounding the Seaway, the harbours of Port Arthur and Fort 
William became unified under the administration of the Lakehead 
Harbour Commission in 1958. From this moment on, except when 
specifically designated, "the harbour" or "Thunder Bay Harbour" 
will refer to this new entity. 
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One of the major issues and controversies concerning 
discussion of transportation costs was the decision to impose 
tolls along the Seaway route. In 1948, as a concession to 
the American government to encourage its participation in the 
Seaway project, Ottawa decided to remove the long standing 
policy of toll-free movement through Canadian canals.^ This 
act was immediately condemned by the shipping industry which 
argued that any tolls on the system would sap any cost benefit 
consumers would gain from the Seaway's construction. In this 
criticism, shipping companies were joined by Canadian 
industry, to whom decreased costs of transport meant increased 
profit or an improved competitive position;, and, of course, 
the port cities bordering the Great Lakes- St. Lawrence basin, 
who would benefit from the increased traffic. These groups 
employed economic nationalism to fight the tolls, claiming 
that the government would not stand up for Canadian rights in 
the face of their southern neighbour, placing Canadian jobs 
and industrial development were at risk.^ 
In reality, the debate over the tolls centred on the 
effect on the cost of general cargo shipments. At the time 
that discussions between the Canadian Seaway Authority and the 
^ When after six years of debate and delays, the Truman 
administration approached the Canadian government regarding "the 
possibility of reaching agreement in principle that the Seaway be 
made self-liquidating through an agreed system of tolls". Canada 
agreed providing any benefit gained through the project would not 
be lost. Canada, House of Commons, Louis St. Laurent to the House, 
Debates (24 April, 1947), p.2354. 
^ Emphasis from the original. A Detailed Study.... p.5. 
60 
American Seaway Corporation were under way over the form of 
the toll structure, similar discussions were taking place 
between C.D. Howe and T.R. McLagan, President of CSL, over the 
merits of the entire Seaway project. McLagan acknowledged 
that even with tolls, the cost of movement of bulk freight 
would decline. For example, using figures leaked from the 
international discussions, he estimated that with the 
elimination of transfer costs, the cost of the transhipment of 
wheat at Kingston, would fall by approximately 2.855 cents per 
bushel of wheat.^ His concern was over the possibility of 
higher tolls on general cargo movement. The cost related to 
return was higher for coastwise cargo freight than it was for 
ocean vessels. He argued that 
the income per ton of freight from say, Liverpool to 
Toronto or Chicago will be much greater than that between 
Montreal and Toronto; with equal tolls applied, the 
percentage increase will be much higher on local 
operation.... The Seaway will not shorten the distance, 
avoid trans-shipment costs, or reduce handling costs on 
such package freight. The only saving on this type of 
freight brought about by the Seaway will be the fact that 
somewhat larger vessels can be used with some increase in 
ship operating efficiency.^ 
He wrote to Howe that "the magnitude of the tolls could wipe 
out any possible savings we can make by bigger and faster 
vessels. 
^ C.D. Howe Papers, MG-27,III B-20 vol.84, file 5.35.T.R. 
McLagan to C.D. Howe, 6 February 1957. 
^ C.D. Howe Papers, MG-27, III B-20 vol.84, file 5.35. McLagan 
to Howe, 25 January 1957. 
^ C.D. Howe Papers, MG-27, III B-20 vol.84, file 5.35. McLagan 
to Howe, 6 February 1957. 
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While the figures that McLagan used in his estimation 
were higher than the eventual toll schedule, the structure of 
the tolls took were essentially the same, with one major 
exception. According to his letters, he expected a higher 
toll rate for general cargo. However, neither he nor anyone 
else expected the inclusion of the Welland Canal into the 
system of tolls as part of the government's plans to make the 
system self-sufficient. The decision was made to fix in 
place two toll structures for the route, one for the Seaway 
between Montreal and Lake Ontario and the second for the 
Welland Canal. This, it was believed, would allow a greater 
flexibility for future changes in the tolls structure.® 
The inclusion of the Welland Canal was a further subject 
of contention between shippers and the Authority. The 
shippers argued that the Welland Canal improvement had been 
completed long before there had been a firm agreement between 
Canada and the United States for the international Seaway and 
that the costs of the project had already been paid for from 
public coffers. This, they argued, showed that the 
government was attempting to make the Seaway into a money 
making venture, which could only adversely affect their 
interests.^ 
® Ibid. 
^ Phillips Collection, MG-6, N-371, Great Lakes Waterways 
Development Association, A Detailed Study of Serious Problems Now 
Confronting All Users of the International St. Lawrence Seaway 
(Montreal-Lake Ontario) and All-Canadian Welland Ship Canal 
(Toronto: 1969), p.4. 
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Table 4.1--Tolls applicable to the movement of cargo 








to Lake Erie 
(Welland 
Canal) 
a) Charge per gross 
registered ton, as per 
national registry of the 
vessel, applicable .06 
whether the vessel is 
wholly or partially 
laden, or is in ballast 
b) Charge per ton of cargo 
as evidenced by ship's 
manifest or similar 
receipt or document, as 
follows: 
-bulk cargo .42 







Source: The St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, Canadian Tolls 
Committee, Report of the Tolls Committee. 12 June 1958, 2, 
Canada, Archives of Ontario, Pamphlet No.65-1958. 
The shipping companies were resolute in their opposition 
to the tolls policy. David Trembly, author of the seventy- 
fifth anniversary history of N.M. Paterson and Sons, How Great 
The Harvest Is, stated that throughout the 1960's, Canadian 
shipping companies fought a constant battle against rising 
costs. The imposition of tolls along the St. Lawrence 
shipping route was a primary factor, along with the rising 
price of fuel, escalating wages and the cost of revamping 
their fleets to meet the new demands of the improved Seaway, 
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in their rising costs. This being the case, one should 
find either an increase in water freight rates paralleling the 
rise in costs or, at the very least, the continuation of the 
status quo. 
Despite this claim, however, water freight rates 
generally dropped. An analysis of the two major commodities 
passing through the Lakehead, grain and iron ore, reveals that 
the freer movement of shipping between the head of the lakes 
and the St. Lawrence tidewater brought about a revolution in 
the industry, based first of all on the increased economy of 
scale. After 1959, with the improvements made to the locks 
and canals, the St. Lawrence could accommodate vessels of a 
draft of approximately 25 feet through the entire system, 
removing the need to transship cargoes before Montreal. 
Prior to 1959, there were two main types of vessels in service 
in the Great Lake-St Lawrence system, "upper lakers" and 
"canallers" . The upper lake vessels, those plying the lakes 
above the Welland Canal, were used either to carry cargoes for 
trade directly within the Upper Great Lakes system or carry 
their goods to transhipment points usually somewhere before 
the Welland locks. At these transhipment points the cargo 
would be stored or transferred to small canallers, whose job 
David Trembley, How Great The Harvest Is. (Erin, Ontario: 
The Boston Mills Press, 1984), p.l20. 
The Seaway was deepened to a draft of 2 7 feet but quite 
naturally the maximum allowance of the vessels must be less than 
that depth. In addition, seasonal water levels can affect the 
maximum allowance draft of vessels. 
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was to carry the cargo to points within or outside the canal 
route. These transsipment points were scattered along the 
Georgian Bay-Upper Lakes section of the waterway, places like 
Port McNicoll and Goderich, or harbours on the Lower Lakes- 
Upper St. Lawrence section, like Port Colborne and 
Kingston.’’^ After 1959, all upper lakers could sail the 
entire route from the Lakehead to Montreal at almost full 
capacity. 
The new economies of scale led the shipping companies to 
invest in new, larger, more powerful and in some cases, more 
specialized ships. N.M. Paterson and Sons, which had 40 
ships in service in 1961, began selling off its older ships in 
that year. By the end of the decade, 25 of its pre-Seaway 
vessels were sold off to make room for the new generation of 
shipping. Canadian Steamship Lines (CSL), Paterson's main 
competitor, increased its total tonnage plying the lakes from 
the 1951 level of 300,000 tons to 570,000 tons by 1965. 
Approximately 80 percent of this 1965 total represented new 
The ports of the Georgian Bay-Upper Lakes section include 
Port McNicoll, Midland, Collingwood, Owen Sound, Goderich, Sarnia 
and Walkerville. The Lower Lakes-Upper St. Lawrence section 
include the ports of Port Colborne, Humberstone, Toronto, 
Lakefield, Peterbourgh, Kingston and Prescott. These are the 
destinations employed by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics in their 
analysis of Canada's grain transport network. Dominion Bureau of 
Statistics, Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1960) . 
13 Trembley, OP cit. appendix 7. 
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construction.In total, 53 new bulk vessels were added to 
the Canadian fleet plying the Great Lakes. 
The revolution in water transport was completed by the 
complementary relationship that developed between the movement 
of grain and the movement of iron ore. One of the prime 
motivations for the construction of the new Seaway system was 
for the shipment of iron ore from the Quebec-Labrador deposits 
to the Canadian and American steel plants surrounding the 
shores of Lakes Ontario, Erie and Michigan. This western 
movement of iron ore became part of the backbone of the whole 
St. Lawrence system. After unloading their cargoes at the 
ports of Chicago, Cleveland or Hamilton, the bulk carriers, 
rather than returning through the St. Lawrence system in 
ballast and paying tolls on an empty hold, would continue on 
to the Lakehead to load up with grain to be taken to Montreal 
or other Quebec ports. Ideally they would pick up other 
cargoes from other Great Lake ports for shipment to the 
Lakehead. In many cases these cargoes would consist of 
limestone, salt or other miscellaneous bulk cargoes.**^ The 
Marine Museum of the Great Lakes, Port Arthur Ship building 
collection, box #287. J.W. McGiffen, Executive Vice-President CSL, 
Transportation '65 to '70 1 April 1965. 
Gary S. Dewar, "Canadian Bulk Construction 1960-1970: Seaway 
and Subsidies" in Inland Seas vol.43 #2 {summer 1987) attached 
vessel information, pp.122-23. 
As the title would suggest, miscellaneous bulk cargoes refer 
to a list cargoes whose volume does not represent a significant 
figure to be listed independently. Such high bulk, low cost 
cargoes include limestone, salt, cement and chemicals. 
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return trip then would be made with a cargo of grain destined 
for Montreal or one of the lower St. Lawrence ports, to start 
the process over again. This relationship, combined with the 
new economies of scale, injected a new effectiveness and 
efficiency into the whole process. 
Given the above, it is not surprising that the volume of 
traffic through the harbour did increase. In fact based 
simply on the statistics of commodity flow, one might be 
tempted to state that, of course, the opening of the St. 
Lawrence Seaway must have improved the Lakehead's economy. 
The total tonnage jumped from 11 million tons in 1958 to 14 
million tons in 1961 and eventually to 20 million tons in 
1970!^^ Certainly that is a very spectacular increase, but 
what did the increase in volume do for the Lakehead and was 
this increase due to the improvement of the Seaway? 
To get an accurate idea of what role these increased 
cargo volumes played in the life of Port Arthur and Fort 
William, four types of cargo will be analyzed -- grains, iron 
ore, forest products and general cargo. The first three 
represent bulk cargoes of which the first two represent the 
largest volumes moving through the port. Forest products 
represent the largest sector employer at the Lakehead and 
surrounding district, employing people in the forest, as well 
as in manufacturing. General cargo has been included because 
Approximate figures taken from Port of Thunder Bav-Cargo 
Statistics circa. 1989. 
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it represents in most cases, the materials needed for 
production and finished products, and can reflect to what 
extent Lakehead manufacturers would have been able to directly 
benefit from the Seaway. 
As one might assume, the largest role of the Thunder Bay 
harbour was the transhipment of prairie grains. Of all of 
the cargoes that passed through the harbour, it is this 
commodity that continually represents the largest volume of 
traffic, as much as 65 percent of the total. Therefore, 
fluctuations in its movement can greatly affect the total 
tonnage figures, as can be seen from the cargo statistics of 
this period. Consequently anything that might have had an 
effect on Canada's grain exports would also have had an impact 
on the Lakehead's harbour statistics. 
The revolution in the shipping industry, brought about by 
changes in the economy of scale and the removal of 
transhipment costs, was bound to have an impact on the cost of 
transport. By referring to the graphs [figures 4.1 to 4.3], 
it is obvious that the rates dropped just after the opening of 
the new Seaway, despite the inclusion of tolls along the canal 
system. In the first year, the cost of transport dropped as 
much as 18 percent for oats from the Lakehead to Montreal and 
throughout the 1960's prices fell as much as 60 percent of the 
pre-Seaway price in 1969.^® The resulting price difference 
The Freight rate for wheat between Port Arthur and Fort 
William, and Montreal fell in the first year by 17 percent; barley 
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Thunder Bay and Montreal, 1958-1969. 
Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Grain Trade 
of Canada. 
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for all of the wheat passing through the twin ports in 1959 
was $5,063,458.31 or approximately 89 cents per ton. A look 
at the other types of grain reveal that they have a parallel 
decline, thus indicating that the factors acting in the rate 
fluctuations were likely the same. 
Although, the water freight rates reacted quickly to the 
Table 4.2--Volume of wheat received by Great Lake-Upper St. 
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v=vessel traffic, r=rail traffic 
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Grain Trade of 
Canada. 
Note: Because of inter-port traffic, the yearly total is 
somewhat higher than the sum of the columns. 
year 1969 saw the largest rate decrease from the 1958 levels; wheat 
declined by 50 percent, barley by 59 percent, flax by 51 percent, 
and rye by 50 percent. Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canal 
Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1958-1970) . 
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improvements in the transportation system, the established 
trade routes were somewhat slow to change. By referring 
to table 4.2, one can see that the volume of grain travelling 
from the Lakehead to the transshipment points west of the 
Seaway decreased steadily through out the 1960's, but not 
dramatically. To put this into perspective though, it must 
be realized that by this time almost all of the grain received 
by these points as destined for production points inland. 
It was export traffic, not the domestic traffic passing 
through these Great Lake ports, that was the heart of the 
Canadian grain trade. This is reflected in the statistics of 
grain exports for the period. By superimposing the graphs 
depicting total grain movement through Thunder Bay and 
Canada's total grain exports for the same period, [figure 4.4] 
the full extent of the impact that export contracts had on the 
Lakehead's commodity movements can be illustrated. For 
example, the explosion in the volume of grain traffic through 
the harbour between 1964 and 1967 corresponds with record 
grain sales to the Soviet Union, Conversely the same is true 
for the 1968 when the loss of Soviet contracts caused a record 
low for the decade in the Lakehead's grain traffic. When one 
considers at the same time that water freight rates increased 
during the years of record sales and declined again during 
slower seasons, it must be realised that fluctuations in these 
This figure is arrived at by multiplying the difference in 
freight rates between 1958 and 1959 by the volume of wheat shipped 
through the harbour. 
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Figure 4.4 
Comparison of the volume of grain passing through the Lakehead 
with that of Canada's total grain exports, 1958-1969. 
Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Grain Trade 
of Canada.; Thunder Bay Harbour Commission. 
Note: The figures for the Lakehead are expressed in millions 
of tons while those for Canada's total exports are in hundred 
millions of bushels. The conversion from one measure to the 
other is not readily available owing to the fact that the 
various grains differ in density from one another. 
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rates were governed by the level of European demand, through 
pressures placed on the system, rather than the opposite, that 
is European demand being stimulated directly by a decline in 
Canadian freight rates. 
While undoubtedly the decline in freight rates had an 
impact on the volume of grain shipments, it was in the 
prairies that the effect of these changes was felt, more so 
than at the Lakehead. The Canadian Wheat Board was 
established to guarantee profits to the Canadian farmer during 
periods of low world prices; however, the result was also that 
it helped to guarantee that the price of Canadian wheat 
remained competitive on world markets. Considering this, it 
is probable that grain exports to Europe would have continued 
passing through Thunder Bay, as long as the demand existed, 
regardless of the construction of the Seaway. The new canal 
system then benefited the prairie economy by improving the 
farmer's profit margin and lowering possible stresses on the 
Canadian system of grain subsidies. 
The savings in the cost of grain shipments would not have 
been realized without the important reciprocal movement of 
iron ore to make the system more efficient. Representing the 
second largest volume of traffic out of the Lakehead, as much 
as 32 percent of the total, iron ore became an important 
factor in the health of the harbour and represented more to 
75 
the regional economy than did grain. Since 1945, 
Atikokan, Ontario, approximately 142 miles west of the port 
cities, had grown from a small rail stop to a bustling mining 
town of over 5 000 people.The growth of communities such 
as Atikokan and later Red Lake, Ontario, resulted in the 
expansion of the twin cities' hinterland. Much of the 
Lakehead's service industry developed to serve not only local 
residents but also the those of the surrounding communities. 
Increased prosperity in the out-lying district had a residual 
effect on the development of Thunder Bay. 
The transportation revolution was a boon for east coast 
iron ore producers; transshipment points were removed, 
economies of scale increased and the exchange relationship 
with grain from the Lakehead lowered transportation costs. 
It was a different story for the iron ore shipped from the 
Lakehead, however. Its movement ran counter to the normal 
flow of goods within the system, travelling east instead of 
west. The largest percentage of this iron ore traffic was 
destined for ports outside of the Seaway system. Therefore, 
the economies of scale did not change. These ports lined 
Lakes Huron, Michigan and Erie and included such centres as 
Chicago, Illinois, Toledo, Ohio, and Buffalo, New York. 
These were not the main destinations, however. Almost half 
Based on the volume of traffic in 1968. Iron ore traffic 
constituted 4 179 345 tons of the 13 604 854 ton total. Port of 
Thunder Bav-Cargo Statistics. 
Fort William Daily Times-Journal. 27 March 1956. 
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of all the iron shipment from the Lakehead were destined for 
Indiana Harbour, on Lake Michigan.The only destination 
within the Seaway system that received iron ore during the 
1960's was Hamilton and then only occasionally. There were no 
shipments further East than Lake Erie for six out the ten 
years between 1961 and 1970.^^ As a result, any increases 
in the volume of iron ore shipments and benefits to the region 
were not based on improved access to markets. In fact the 
regional iron ore industry was instead finding its markets 
shrinking thanks to the new Seaway. 
Prior to the Seaway's opening, the Lake Superior iron ore 
district, which included the Steep Rock and Mesabi Ranges, 
held a virtual monopoly on the supply of ore to the American 
mid-west. However, instead of allowing the local iron ore 
industry increased access to markets, the St. Lawrence's 
improvements opened the existing market to increased 
competition, thus ending its monopoly. In short, district 
producers found themselves competing with higher grade ores 
from eastern Canada and South America. 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Shipping Report: 
International Shipping vol. Ill {Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1961-70). 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Shipping Report: Coastwise 
shipping vol.II (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1961-70). 
"I am sure you realize that the Lake Superior District no 
longer has a monopoly on ore supply for Mid-western furnaces, nor 
is the ore of the Steep Rock range considered superior to others as 
it once was. A decade ago neither the St. Lawrence Seaway nor the 
Large taconite plants were in existence.... Lake Superior direct 
shipping ores are also losing out to higher grade material from 
eastern Canada and South America. The St. Lawrence Seaway and open 
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Where the iron ore traffic out of Thunder Bay harbour 
experienced a positive impact was in the cost of transport. 
As was stated earlier, the complementary relationship that 
developed between movement of grain and iron ore within the 
system helped to lead to a general decrease in transportation 
costs and this appears to have been system'wide. While this 
decrease was quite pronounced for the movement of grain - 
there were of course more factors involved in that rate 
change-- the rates on the movement of Steep Rock iron ore 
fluctuated only slightly. 
There is no single source recording water freight rates 
for this commodity and the information as a result is 
incomplete. However, with the data that is available it can 
be determined that the rate did drop during this period. One 
indicator involves the analysis of the Lake Erie Base Price on 
iron ore between 1956 and 1970, which reveals that the price 
for Mesabi non-bessemer grade ore, the ore exported from 
Northwestern Ontario, fluctuated little during the period. It 
did, however, drop by ten cents in 1963 reflecting the same 
drop in transportation costs. 
How this translates into an actual figure is difficult 
but not impossible to determine. There is information quoting 
the industrial Midwest to salt water." Phillips Collection, MG-6, 
C-46. C.B. Jacobs, President Caland Ore Company Ltd. to A.H. Hart, 
Vice-president Canadian National Railways, 27 March 1961. 
Canada, Canadian Minerals Yearbook. (Ottawa: Department of 
Energy Mines and Resources, 1964), p.215. 
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the 1970 base rate for iron ore transport between Thunder Bay 
and the Lower Lakes as being US$1.78 1/8 per long ton.^^ 
When one compares the 1960 water rate between the Lakehead and 
Ashtabula, Michigan of $2.10 per ton, it is obvious that the 
1963 decrease in transportation costs could not have been the 
only one during the decade.This further rate decline 
probably occurred around 1967 when, according to the Canadian 
Minerals Yearbook, the rate from Duluth, Minnesota, the 
Lakehead's American counterpart, to Chicago, Illinois was 
US$1.90 per long ton.^® If this was also the same price for 
iron transport from Port Arthur to Chicago, as is reasonable 
to expect, then that the rate would have dropped a further 11 
7/8 cents per long ton between 1963 and 1967. This would 
bring the decrease to approximately 31 7/8 cents per long ton 
or 15.2 per cent, for the period between 1960 and 1970. 
Despite this fairly substantial rate decrease, it is 
doubtful if it had much of an impact on the development of the 
industry in the region. First of all, while the actual 
traffic volumes of iron ore out of Port Arthur did increase 
somewhat during this period, it was not by a great amount. 
These volumes hovered between 2,500,000 and 3,500,000 tons 
Canada, Canadian Mineral Yearbook. (Ottawa: Department of 
Energy, Mines and Resources, 1970). 
Phillips Collection, MG-6, N-104. Northwestern Ontario 
Development Association, Submission to the Royal Commission on 
Transportation at Port Arthur 28 May 196 0, p.41. 
Canada, Canadian Mineral Yearbook. (Ottawa: Department of 
Energy, Mines and Resources, 1967). 
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consistently through this period, not surpassing the 3,500,000 
ton mark until 1968.^^ This year coincides with two events, 
the opening of the Valley Camp iron ore terminal in Fort 
William and the bringing into production of the Griffith Mine 
at Red Lake, Ontario. In 1968, its first year of production, 
the Stelco owned mine produced 501,000 long tons of pelleted 
iron ore for transport. The Valley Camp new automated 
facility at Fort William made the movement of the increased 
traffic through the harbour more efficient. It allowed the 
ore to be dumped from rail cars while in motion to be stored 
in giant "surge bins". Either from these surge bins or 
directly from the rail cars, the ore boats could be loaded at 
a rate of 5,000 long tons per hour.^° 
The fluctuations in the iron ore traffic out of the 
Thunder Bay harbour can also be seen in the production levels 
in the region. By referring to table 4.3, it is possible to 
see that production was hardly consistent, rising over 1.1 
million tons over three years between 1961 and 1964 only to 
drop .7 million tons in the two years following. Had 
production been influenced by the decline in water freight 
rates, it is reasonable to assume that it should have 
continued to increase after the 1963 rate change. Instead, 
the largest increase in production came two years prior, in 
There is one exception to these figures. In 1964, 
3,661,515 tons of iron ore existed the harbour. Ibid. 
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1961. It is more likely that the conversion to pelletization 
in 1966 by both Steep Rock Iron Mines and Caland Ore Company 
had a greater impact on the region, allowing them to ship a 
larger volume of ore for the same cost while employing people 
in the pelletization process. By 1968 most of the iron ore 
passing through the Lakehead was pelletized. 
To discover the reason why changes in the water freight 
rate had little or no impact on the movement of this bulk 
cargo, one must turn to the railways. The CNR transported 
all of the ore to the docks at Port Arthur and Fort William. 
Unfortunately, any benefits the mines may have received from 
the Seaway improvements were swallowed up in freight rate 
increases instituted by the CNR. Concern over freight rate 
hikes were expressed in 1961 when the CNR proposed a 2 0 
percent increase in the rate affecting iron ore shipments to 
Port Arthur. The CNR's decision was based on a failure of 
the mining companies at Atikokan to live up to volume figures 
announced in 1954. These companies were given a preferential 
rate based on a specific volume of traffic. The CNR's return 
on investment was not, therefore, satisfactory.^^ The rate 
was scheduled to increase from $1.45 per ton to $1.74 per ton 
Phillips Collection, MG-6, C-46. The new rate became 
effective 1 May 1961 " the increase in question was made after a 
long and exhaustive study of the situation which disclosed that the 
rate was not returning sufficient revenue to make a reasonable 
return for our services and investment." A. Sutherland, general 
rates officer CNR to Dr. M.W. Bartley, general manager Cliffs of 
Canada Ltd., 10 May 1961. 
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between Atikokan and Port Arthur, effectively negating any 
effeciency achieved through the Seaway project. 
As with any other enterprise, the cost of transportation 
can affect its future. For the Caland Ore Company of 
Chicago, one of the three companies exploiting the Steep Rock 
deposits, concerns were raised over the future development of 
their holdings. C.B. Jacobs, the President of Caland, stated 
that "any significant change in the total cost of delivering 
this ore to market would be a major deterrent to spending 
large sums to develop underground ore for future mining. 
Considering these facts, the movement to pelletization of 
the iron later in the decade can be seen as a response to the 
rising rail costs and increased competition within the midwest 
market. The purer, more uniform product, meant more 
efficient handling and increased product price. It is 
doubtful that the investment in pelletization would have been 
necessary, had the Seaway offered a sufficient reduction in 
price and allowed the Atikokan companies to remain 
competitive. 
Despite the increases in the shipment of grain and other 
bulk commodities, they had very little impact on Port Arthur 
and Fort William outside of the improvement projects. The 
Lakehead was simply a transhipment point for these commodities 
and the fluctuations in their volume do not reflect the level 
Phillips Collection, MG-6, C-46. C.B. Jacobs to A.H. Hart, 
27 March 1961, p.2. 
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of the area's production. The grain itself was not produced 
at the Lakehead, but only handled and stored there until it 
could be transhipped, destined for eastern ports and Europe. 
Since all of these bulk cargoes were high turned-over 
commodities and not stored for long periods of time, their 
expected increases in volume could easily be handled with only 
slight expansion of facilities. The Lakehead then could 
handle a larger volume of these goods than was its capacity. 
Where this translates into benefits for the municipality is 
primarly through increased employment at the actual point of 
transhipment and, secondarily, through the infusion of capital 
into the communities via building contracts or simply the 
redistribution of local wages.Between 1961 and 1971, the 
number of jobs produced in the grain handling industry alone 
increased by 322 people or about 24.3 percent. 
Unlike either grain or iron ore, forest products 
represented only a minor percentage of the over-all traffic 
leaving the Lakehead. This must not be equated, however, 
with the importance of this industry to the local economy. 
With a total of ten pulp and paper mills, four directly at the 
Lakehead itself, and numerous small sawmills scattered 
This last point is not easily measured. The increased 
employment would result in an increase of cash flow to other 
industries such as retailers. 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1961). Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of 
Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971). 
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throughout the region, the forest products industry- 
represented the largest employer in the region. As a 
manufacturer, this industry was the largest employer in the 
twin cities engaging 2,945 people in 1961.^^ This figure, 
however, does not include those employed in what is known as 
the "woodlands", people employed in the harvesting of trees. 
The 1961 census figures for this group in Port Arthur and Fort 
William, totalling 1,126 people, do not adequately represent 
the number of people employed in this capacity. Many of the 
forest product companies employed men in work camps, small 
temporary communities, away from the cities. Great Lakes 
Forest Products alone employed some 1,250 men in the forests 
that year.^^ 
There are further differences between the movement of 
forest products and the movement of grain and iron ore. The 
primary mode of transport out of the harbour for the latter 
two commodities was by ship. An increase in volume would 
correlate to an increase in production and, hypothetically, an 
increase in prosperity. On the other hand, the primary mode 
of transportation for the forest industry was by rail. In 
1958, approximately 60 percent of Great Lakes' newsprint 
reached its markets in the United States in this manner. 
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada. 
Ottawa, Queens Printer, 1961). 
Great Lakes Paper Co., 1961 Annual Report, p.4. 
Great Lakes Paper Co. Annual Report 1959. 
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An improvement to water services then would be reflected 
either in increased use of water transport or a decrease in 
transportation costs by virtue of competition in freight 
rates. 
Industry wide, there was some scepticism over the impact 
of the Seaway on the forest industry. The two important 
mitigating factors were first, the decision to impose tolls 
along the canal system and then, the potential classification 
of the various forest products as general cargo. It was 
believed that both would nullify any discount in water 
transport gained by the improved route. Others, such as the 
Canadian Pulp and Paper Association expected that, where there 
was incentive to ship via the Seaway, the competing rail 
systems would offer competitive rates to protect their share 
of the market.^® 
Outside of the costs of transportation for the newsprint 
industry there was another concern which discouraged the 
extensive use of the Seaway --the market itself. Most 
customers were not interested in stock-piling large 
quantities of newsprint. As a result, shipments were usually 
of a moderate size and required quick and efficient transport, 
a service more reliable with the rail companies. 
Given this general attitude of the industry, it is 
surprising that the local pulp and paper mills awaited the 
38 iiU]-ge Low Tolls for Pulp, Paper" Financial Post 
39 Ibid 
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opening of Seaway with mild anticipation. Two of these 
mills, the Abitibi Mission Mill and Great Lakes Paper, 
expanded their facilities during the 1950's, ostensibly in 
preparation for the Seaway. The latter took a very 
calculated view of the benefits open to them from the Seaway 
project. While logically they hoped for increased access to 
market, much of their expectation appeared to have involved 
those already existing: 
An important factor in this consideration 
[expansion of the newsprint operation] is the 
approaching completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway. 
We believe the Seaway is likely to bring a new 
surge of growth throughout the great midwest area 
which our Lakehead location uniquely fits to 
serve. 
In other words, the mill's management was banking on improved 
prosperity in their traditional markets. Accordingly, they 
expanded their paper making, as well as their docking, 
facilities in preparation of the Seaway opening. As for the 
movement of their products, management had expected to 
increase the proportion of their product transported by water 
to 53 percent in 1959, up from 40 percent the year before.^^ 
To get a complete view of how the shipment of commodities 
changed throughout the decade, accurate statistics are needed 
from the various mills or, at the very least, from trucking or 
rail industries, which could be compared with the readily 
available shipping reports. Unfortunately these are 
Great Lakes Paper, 1955 Annual Report, p.2. 
Great Lakes Paper, Annual Report 1959. 
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unavailable. Despite this though, there are a number of 
indicators to suggest that the improved transportation system 
did not have a great affect on the forest products industry. 
For example, a comparison of Great Lakes figures for shipments 
to customers, with the actual cargo statistics of Fort William 
harbour for 1959, reveal that in actual fact they could have 
potentially shipped only 49 percent of their products by 
water. Assuming they were the only company using the harbour 
facilities to transport their goods, it means that their 
target of 53 percent water transport was not reached. 
Throughout the decade, the volume of traffic in forest 
products out of the harbour continued to increase, as did many 
of the other commodities. Figure 4.5, illustrates this 
increase in the volume through the harbour. On average, it 
increased approximately 10.4 percent per year, reaching a peak 
in 1966. While this would tend to suggest that some benefit 
was gained from water transport by the forest industry 
locally, it is questionable whether access to new markets or 
a decline in freight rates were the catalysts. Throughout 
the decade, at most only six percent of the region's 
newsprint, the largest single commodity produced by the local 
forest product sector, travelled east of Lake Erie. For the 
other forest products that figure was even less.'*'^ The main 
The fine papers produced at the Abitibi provincial Paper 
mill in Port Arthur did not even use water transport at all. All 
of its products reached markets via rail and transport trucks. 
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Source: Thunder Bay Harbour Commission. 
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destinations tended to remain the same as before the Seaway's 
opening, Chicago and Detroit, outside the Seaway route. This 
suggests that the improved transportation route then did 
little to open access to new markets as some expected. 
This lack of new newsprint markets can be explained by 
viewing the market trends in the United States, the main 
consumer of Lakehead produced newsprint. On an industry-wide 
basis newsprint consumption paralleled the growth in the 
American GNP throughout the 1950's and 1960's, though stunted 
somewhat by the advent of television during the 1950's and a 
rash of newspaper strikes in the early 1960's. The impact of 
these events, combined with a slow population growth in 
eastern US markets, slowed the growth of the industry somewhat 
during the early part of the decade.These factors would 
invariably reduce the potential of Lakehead-based newsprint 
producers to find new markets there. 
On the other hand, the growth experienced in the 
newsprint industry during the middle of the decade closely 
followed a jump in the US GNP and growth in advertising, 
experienced mainly in the American west and midwest, the 
traditional markets of Great Lakes Paper. This would explain 
why the markets for newsprint produced in the Lakehead 
remained relatively the same; the industry benefited from 
expansion in existing markets rather than the development of 
National Archives of Canada, RG-31, vol. 1505, file 5510-4. 
Department of Trade and Commerce, Commodities in International 
Markets: Newsprint. Ottawa, June 1967. 
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new ones. From this perspective, the expectations of the 
Seaway's impact on market development expressed in 1955 by 
Great Lakes' administration was quite close to the mark. 
Perhaps the most accurate account of how the Seaway 
affected commodity flow comes from an Ontario government 
review of the transportation issues of Northwestern Ontario. 
An analysis of various commodities transported by rail out of 
the Lakehead in 1969, showed that 810,000 tons of newsprint 
were loaded for shipment.This is in contrast with the 
roughly 242,000 tons that left the cities via Thunder Bay 
harbour. Considering the fact the volume of newsprint that 
was moved by ship did actually expand that year, it is likely 
that the rail-to-ship ratio was normally higher than 4:1 ratio 
registered. 
If this was indeed the case, was it possible that because 
of the competition from their shipping rivals, the railway 
companies were forced to lower their freight rates? This is 
doubtful. In 1958, it cost Great Lakes $3,340,000 or 10.7 
percent of their profits to deliver their products to the 
customer.By 1968, this figure jumped to $8,282,000 or 
11.7 percent of their profits, making it generally more 
expensive to ship their product to market. In other words. 
Ontario, Department of Treasury and Economics, The 
Northwestern Ontario Region; A Transportation Impact Study. (Draft 
Final Report, 1970), Addendum 3, Table 4. 
45 Great Lakes Paper Co., Op cit.. 1958. 
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savings in the cost of transport were not realized from a more 
competitive freight rate structure. 
Thus far most of the discussion of forest products has 
involved the pulp and paper industry, largely for reasons 
concerning the availability of records. Those dealing with 
lumber and sawmills, are sketchy at best. This is because of 
their rather transient nature and the varying scales of their 
operations. The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources does 
not have an accurate picture of most of these operations for 
the 1960's. Without statistics dealing with the productive 
capacities of these operations it is difficult to judge the 
direct impact the Seaway had on them. Despite this fact, 
however, one can come to some basic conclusions concerning the 
industry based on the traffic volume of the various 
commodities leaving the port. These commodities include 
pulpwood, lumber, railway ties, tar and creosote, and 
plywood. With the exception of pulpwood few of these 
products consistently amounted to over 2,000 tons in traffic. 
In addition, much of the statistics reflect one time jumps in 
volume which only settled down the following year. Tar and 
creosote produced by Northern Wood Preservers, jumped from a 
little over 2,000 tons in 1963 to over 10,000 tons two years 
later, only to fall and remain under 1,000 tons for the rest 
of the decade. Activities like this suggest one of two 
things; a lack of consistent markets, or a temporary shift in 
46 Great Lakes Paper Co., Op cit. 1968. 
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the choice of transportation modes. It is reasonable to 
assume that had there been an decline in the cost of water 
transport via the Seaway, the statistics would reflect a long- 
term growth in commodity traffic as producers switched 
transportation mediums. Had the problem been the former, 
inconsistent markets, then the demand causing the drastic 
fluctuations would have existed despite the improvement in 
water transport. 
The greatest expected impact of the St. Lawrence Seaway 
on the future of the Lakehead was in it development as a 
seaport, in competition with Montreal and Toronto. The basis 
for this was the belief that as the economy of the west 
prospered with the increased flow of grain exports, the volume 
of trade travelling west would also increase. In addition, 
the opening of the Seaway meant large freighters could now 
traverse the entire length of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes 
system, effectively by-passing Montreal in favour of points 
further west such as Port Arthur-Fort William. This fact 
would increase the Lakehead's importance as a port in the 
Canadian economy, as well as adding jobs in the local 
transportation industry. There is, however, a more important 
potential side-effect dealing with the Lakehead's industrial 
development. Should transportation costs become low enough, 
more industry could have been attracted to the twin cities 
since the cost of transport would no longer be a discouraging 
factor to industrial expansion. 
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Prior to the opening of the new general cargo facilities 
in 1962, there were 12 freight and transit sheds located in 
the cities owned by the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific 
Railways. Even by the late 1950's, their 70,000 ton storage 
capacity was being tested by the volume of traffic in and out 
of the harbour. Based on the recommendations of the Gordon 
Report, a 500 acre section of waterfront between the two 
cities was developed for the transfer and storage of general 
cargo. At a cost of over $8.5 million, the terminal included 
docking berths for two Upper Lake vessels and one salt water 
vessel and facilities for handling freight by the two rail 
companies as well as transport trucks. It was even boasted 
that the plans for the "Keefer Terminals" made it adaptable to 
the developing trends in modern transport; piggy-backing, roll 
on-roll off stock, and containerization.^^ All of these 
new advancements could be seen as a general improvement to the 
transportation network, making it more efficient and cheaper 
to use. 
While by the end of the decade, the volume of general 
cargo traffic did not meet the expectation of 1 million tons, 
there was a fairly sizable increase over all. In the latter 
part of the 1950's just prior to the opening of the Seaway, 
general cargo movements in and out of the twin cities amounted 
to an average of about 367,000 tons between 1955 and 1958. 
Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society, Keefer Terminal File. 
Gerald Millar and W.H. Van Allen, The Lakehead: An up-to-date 
Harbour. May 1962. 
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This level jumped to an average of 662,000 tons per year for 
the first decade of the Seaway's operation. That is an 
impressive 87 per cent increase. But even with this 
increase, however, there was a general feeling of 
dissatisfaction over the role the movement of general cargo 
played at the Lakehead. 
Most of the growth of this traffic occurred between 1959 
and 1965, when it reached a peak of 705,000 tons. After that 
point the volume slowly declined until it bottomed out at 
290,000 tons in 1973. Part of the problem rested on the 
inability of the Lakehead to attract overseas shipments of 
general cargo. The majority of the growth experienced was in 
coastwise shipping, which by 1965 accounted for about 92 
percent of the traffic. Local promoters had expected that 
the Seaway would have encouraged a higher level of foreign 
vessel visits, since they could now travel directly to the 
Lakehead to pick up grain. To a certain extent this was not 
a realistic expectation, since the trip to the Lakehead was 
longer than Montreal and that the tolls existed along the 
Seaway route.In fact, this was known as early as 1955. 
That year, in a presentation to George Marler, the Minister 
of Transport, the Canadian shipowners pointed out that "even 
C.D. Howe Papers, MG-27 III B-20, volume 58, file 47. 
Presentation made to George C. Marler by Canada Steamship Lines, 
Colonial Steamships Ltd, N.M. Paterson & Sons Ltd., Upper Lakes & 
St. Lawrence Transportation Co. Ltd., Hall Corporation of Canada 
Ltd. , Keystone Transports Ltd; Mohawk Navigation Company Ltd. , 
August 1955, p.9. 
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if all of the existing tramps [vessels] did proceed to the 
Head of the Lakes, the grain they could carry in one season 
from the Lakehead would only be some 50 percent of the amount 
they presently carry from Montreal due to the increased time 
on voyage and reduced capacity within the Lakes." 
Attracting more cargo vessels to the twin cities was more 
important to the Lakehead than simply increasing their cargo 
statistics; it was also the key to lowering freight rates. 
At a forum on the subject of Seaway transport held in 1963 
delegates representing business, government and the shipping 
companies were told that if the port authorities could somehow 
develop trade by attracting tramp vessels, "the overall 
transportation costs from foreign ports into the Canadian West 
can be very substantially reduced. The problem was, 
however, that these tramp vessels were unlikely to call on the 
Lakehead because of the small amount of general cargo traffic 
entering the port. Even if they could combine the cargo 
destined for twin cities with those destined for other ports 
along their route, there was a loss of stowage efficiency, and 
therefore loss of cost benefit. It was easier for them to 
discharge their cargoes in Montreal for rail shipments to the 
west and then load the grain or iron ore for the return 
voyage. 
Ibid. 
^^.Phillips Collection, MG-6, N-10. Proceedings of the Seaway 
Transportation Forum. Winnipeg 27 May 1963, p.35. 
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The problem of attracting increased general cargo traffic 
into the Lakehead illustrates the dependence the harbour had 
on the prosperity of the West. Of course, the Northwestern 
Ontario market was not large enough to absorb an increase of 
general cargo, therefore any of this cargo entering the port 
would ultimately destined for Prairies. The problem was that 
while it was true that the West was prospering because of the 
increased grain shipments, its growth simply was not enough to 
boost the demand needed to stimulate large general cargo 
shipments. This was in turn aggravated by the fact that the 
prairies themselves were a small market. As a result, the 
carriers were unlikely to increase their business through the 
port as long as the volume of traffic remained small. 
Equally as important to the shipper was the question of 
reliable services offered by water transport. Although low 
cost transport was an important issue, there were other 
factors in the choice of modes of transportation, perhaps the 
most important for the shipment of general cargo, being the 
speed and reliability of the various types of transport. 
Where it would take a ship three to four days to make the 
journey from Southern Ontario to the Lakehead, that same 
distance could be covered by the inland transport mediums in 
just 25 to 35 hours. The shipper also had to contend with 
a winter freeze up, which limited the shipping season to about 
Ontario, Department of Treasury and Economics, Op cit . 
pp.2 - 8. 
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eight months per year. This meant that if the shipper wanted 
to use the Seaway to transport his products, then he would 
either have to find alternate transport for his goods or 
stockpile the goods in preparation for the winter months; a 
very unpopular option if the product was a high cost item. 
The whole question of reliablity was intensified by the 
transhipment times at the Keefer Terminal itself. Despite the 
fact that the port authorities boasted state of the art 
facilities, the fact remained that by 1965 they were already 
experiencing bottlenecks in the system. A study done in 1966 
of the terminal's facilities showed some unanticipated 
problems; the small size and diversity of the consignments 
required increased time and space for sorting, the amount of 
trucking traffic did not materialize, forcing a burden on the 
rail facilities, and the slow turn around time meant space 
needed for incoming cargoes was already filled by existing 
stock. The report filed for the federal Department of 
Public Works, suggested that the situation would deteriorate 
as the decade continued. 
By 1969, the situation had not improved, as the drop in 
cargo traffic partially shows. A study of the transportation 
system in Northwestern Ontario by the provincial government 
revealed that "the quality and price for [all of] the 
transport services fall short of the low-cost, high quality 
Gibb, Underwood and McLellan Consulting Engineers, Keefer 
Lakehead Terminal Expansion: Lakehead Harbour Improvements. 1966, 
p.ll. 
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criteria that would have to be met if transportation is to 
play a more positive role in the development of the 
region. This suggests that the Seaway did not have the 
anticipated impact of either acquiring an increasingly larger 
share of general cargo traffic nor forcing an improvement in 
the rival transport mode by offering a competitive 
alternative. In fact, the cost of trucking and rail 
transport increased throughout the decade, while increasing at 
the same time the percentage of general cargo traffic that 
they carried. 
The fact that generally the St. Lawrence Seaway had a 
larger impact on the volume of bulk cargoes as opposed to 
general cargoes is not difficult to understand. The nature 
of low-cost, high volume products lends itself to movement by 
ship: the commodities are needed in large volumes; can be 
stockpiled by both the producer and the consumer; and the 
length of time needed to transport them by ship will not 
drastically affect their availability. The opposite is true 
of general cargo, whose high cost discourages the use of 
stockpiling. The disadvantage for the twin cities was that 
most of benefits of the Seaway, the lower transport costs and 
improved competitive position, went to the producer outside of 
the Lakehead. With being the transshipment point for bulk 
Ontario, Department of Treasury and Economics. OP cit. Part 
IV-B, p.3. 
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cargoes, the communities gained only from the ability to 
handle the commodities rather than direct benefits of improved 
transportation. It was these benefits that Port Arthur and 
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Chapter 5; The Lakehead's Industrial Evolution. 
As was shown in the previous chapter, the opening of the 
St. Lawrence Seaway had a beneficial effect on the commodity 
flow entering and exiting Thunder Bay harbour. These overall 
figures reveal that there was a significant growth in traffic 
volume, increasing to an average of 15,209,100 tons during the 
1960's from 13,329,750 tons recorded the previous decade. 
While on paper, this would seem a successful increase when one 
considers that a large majority of the cargo that passed 
through the harbour was neither destined for nor originated at 
the Lakehead, one must question how much of a benefit there 
was for the communities. In fact, as illustrated by the 
experiences of the iron ore industry of Atikokan, which 
seemingly grew in spite of challenges produced by the Seaway, 
an overwhelming endorsement of its impact on the region must 
be reserved. 
To properly evaluate the impact of the St. Lawrence 
Seaway on the Lakehead, the flow of goods in and out of the 
harbour must be placed in the context of the economic grow of 
the communities and their expectations for that growth, 
expectations that revolved around a revitalization of the 
regional economy mainly through increased industrial 
development and diversification. A large sector of that 
local economy had been based on resource extraction and 
exploitation, the largest of these being the forest industry. 
Most of the capital expenditure that occurred in the region 
during that decade had involved the expansion and improvement 
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of existing facilities rather than the development of new 
ones. So, while the economy of Northwestern Ontario was 
growing, it did so at a rate where the job opportunities did 
not match the population growth. A 1961 study, done by the 
Northwestern Ontario Commission on Employment, found that the 
region's population during the 1950's had grown a full 35 
percent while the job market had grown only 12 percent.^ To 
complicate matters, many of the resource based industries 
offered only seasonal employment to a large section of local 
population, a fact which further limited economic growth.^ 
The inauguration of the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959 
opened along with it, a whole new realm of possibilities for 
the Lakehead. It threatened to remove the relative isolation 
which had prevented the development of Northwestern Ontario's 
full potential. The region, rich in many natural resources 
like minerals, forest products and water for power generation, 
was an important piece in the economy of the province and the 
country. It was Ontario's second most important source of 
minerals and the Lakehead ranked among the world's largest 
paper making communities.^ It was a region wealthy in 
^ Northwestern Ontario Commission on Employment, Report of the 
Commission. (Port Arthur: 1961), p.2. 
^ The resource based industries were not the only ones 
offering seasonal employment. The closing of the shipping season 
coincided with the lay off of a large number of people in the 
transportation industry, mostly the grain handlers. 
^ J.R. Nininger, Ontario Economic Council, A Survey of 
Changing Employment Patterns at the Lakehead Cities of Port Arthur 
and Fort William. (London: University of Western Ontario, 1964), 
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everything except one vitally important resource --people. 
The Seaway promised to bring people and markets closer through 
a more efficient transportation system and cheaper transport 
costs. The result of this perception was that throughout the 
first decade of the Seaway's operation, much was made of the 
Lakehead's geographic position by local promoters, dead centre 
between the markets of east and west, and its location in an 
efficient transportation network. These promised to be 
strong selling points to prospective investors if the Lakehead 
was to attract new industry to the area. 
To ascertain just how the Lakehead fared economically 
during the 1960's poses something of a difficult problem, 
owing primarily to the mixed signals transmitted concerning 
the communities' growth over the period. Figures 
representing high seasonal unemployment were recorded at the 
same time that some employers were having problems filling job 
vacancies and fantastic growth in the service industry 
occurred at the same time that certain sectors of the 
manufacturing industry were experiencing difficulty. When 
these facts are viewed independently two different pictures of 
local development emerge; one of prosperity, the other of 
economic uncertainty. Viewed together, however, a picture of 
an area in flux develops, struggling to deal with changes to 
both its local economy and the economy of the nation. 
Locally, the population and the regional hinterland was 
pp.48-52. 
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growing, stimulating the growth of service industries, while 
at the same time the large established industries faced the 
challenge of competitiveness with the outside world. The 
result was a change in the local industrial base and a crisis 
in some industries. 
Perhaps one of the most enduring weaknesses experienced 
by the regional economy was the problem of unemployment, most 
of it seasonally caused. Because of the resource based 
economy, a large number of the regional industries were 
greatly affected by seasonal fluctuations. Whether it was 
the closing of the shipping season with the winter freeze up, 
or a slow down in the woodlands when the snow fell, many local 
people found themselves laid off until spring or even summer. 
Although it was a problem known during the previous decade, 
the issue of this type of unemployment, as well as others, 
generated great concern as the 1960's opened. In a brief to 
the local mayors and Members of Parliament, the Fort William- 
Port Arthur District Labour Council pleaded for help to deal 
with what they saw as a "grave unemployment situation. 
According to the brief's calculations, over 20 percent of the 
Lakehead's labour force was unemployed during fall, winter and 
spring months. While at first glance, this seems to be an 
extreme figure, the fact that of the four industries that were 
^ Fort William-Port Arthur District Labour Council, Brief 
Concerning the Serious Unemployment Situation in the Fort William- 
Port Arthur Areas. June 1960, p.l. 
105 
most affected by seasonal fluctuation, water^transport, grain 
storage, forestry and logging, and construction, accounted for 
6,184 employees or approximately 18 percent of the local 
workforce, the figures the council supplied enters the realm 
of the possible. For communities in this position, regular 
seasonal lay-offs become a problem, especially in periods of 
recession.' At these times only those people with a certain 
level of seniority had any expectation of being rehired once 
the industry restarted, leaving the unfortunate either to find 
other work or the support of Unemployment Insurance. This 
would in turn cause ripples through the economy as it affected 
the level of the population's disposable income needed to 
support other local industries. 
Concern over the unemployment situation at the beginning 
of the decade was aggravated to a large extent by the growing 
perception that two of the major manufacturers at the Lakehead 
were "just about on the Rocks -- on their way out."^ This 
concern was expressed in reference to the serious situations 
facing Can Car and the Port Arthur Shipbuilding Company 
(Portship) both which had been suffering in the later part of 
the 1950's. Can Car's loss of the trailer and bus operations 
to the A.V. Roe plant of Montreal in 1959 was a serious blow 
to the community, forcing almost 1,000 people or 50 percent of 
the staff out of work. Although the situation at Portship 
was not as dramatic, it too had been the victim of a harsh 
5 Ibid, p.3. 
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business climate. Throughout the 1950's the number of 
employees had dropped from its normal operating staff and 
employment pool of between 800 and 1,000 people to between 200 
and 300 where it remained for most of next decade.^ 
In each case, Portship and Can Car owed most of their 
financial problems and inability to gain contracts to the cost 
of transportation, both of raw materials from eastern steel 
mills and of the final product to market. In a brief to the 
Royal Commission on Transportation, Portship's management 
reported that "since the war there has been considerable 
shipbuilding but high freight rates involved in bringing 
materials to the Lakehead have pretty well put us out of 
competition with Collingwood and the yards on the St. Lawrence 
River.For Portship, the situation did not improve 
throughout the rest of the decade even with the opening of the 
Seaway. As part of the Canadian Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Limited (CSEL), owned by Canada Steamship Lines, it was 
relegated to doing ship repairs, a few ship conversions -- 
installing auto-loading equipment-- and work for the forest 
industry. By the end of the decade, the local management's 
° "...in normal periods the firm employs from 800 to 1000 men 
or about 10 % of the wage earners of the city. " Port Arthur 
Industrial Committee, Brief Submitted to the Roval Commission on 
the Coasting Trade., 22 August 1955, Thunder Bay Historical Museum 
Archives, Port Arthur Chamber of Commerce Collection; Fort 
William-Port Arthur and District Labour Council, Op cit., p.4. 
^ Phillips Collection, MG-6 n-104, p.l6. Northwestern Ontario 
Development Association, Submission to the Roval Commission on 
Transportation. Port Arthur, 28, 1960. 
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efforts were directed towards finding what it termed as "bread 
and butter" work, contracts that would cover the basic cost of 
man-hours and fringe benefits needed to keep a knowledgable 
workforce employed for when more lucrative contracts became 
available.® For the entire decade, all of the ship contracts 
for CSEL went to the Collingwood operation in Southern 
Ontario. 
The story was somewhat similar for Can Car. On the 
subject of the trailer operations which the Fort William plant 
was eventually able to regain, R.E. Henderson, Can Car's 
general manager, wrote that 
The cost of transporting raw materials inward to the Fort 
William Plant and finished trailers to the market 
therefore represents a complete competitive disadvantage. 
In dollars, this cost includes $200 (present Piggy back 
$50 for incoming freight. This is a 
disadvantage because approximately 80 % of 





Part of the problem was that, in the case of Can Car, the 
plant was unable to take full advantage of savings offered by 
the Seaway, being forced to ship all its finished products by 
rail. The nature of the products, size, cost of the items, 
and sophistication of their construction, made them 
uneconomical to send by ship. Much of this was due to the 
cost of handling the items and the time involved in their 
® Marine Museum of the Great Lakes, Kingston Shipyards 
Collection, box 9, file 21, p.3. Port Arthur Shipbuilding Company, 
Annual Report 1968. 
^ Phillips Collection, MG-6 a-14. R.E. Henderson to W.H. 
Johnson, Canadian Pacific Railways., 10 December 1962. 
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transportation, which was measured in days rather than hours. 
While it is true that the rail freight rates may have been 
affected by the Seaway's competition, it was not enough to 
make the Lakehead manufacturer more competitive in eastern 
markets. 
When dealing with western markets. Can Car experienced 
another problem, one that almost defies logic. Because of 
the marketing abilities of the railways and their freight rate 
policies, the Fort William operation was forced "on occasion 
to ship units to Toronto to pick up payloads to effect final 
delivery of the trailer to Western Canadian points with a 
lower overall transportation cost."^° This being the case 
one must question whether the Seaway had any impact on any of 
the competing transport mediums in the effect of lower freight 
rates or the removal of discriminatory pricing policies. 
Eventually, when Can Car's management turned the company 
around in the latter half of the decade, it did so by working 
around the geographic disadvantages and using an aggressive 
marketing and contract acquisition approach. Throughout the 
rest of the decade a dealer network was established in Canada 
and the US for marketing and servicing their products which 
now included among other things rubber-tired skidders for the 
forest industry. By 1964, the sales of these skidders 
exceeded the revenues of their bus operations, the former 
10 Ibid. 
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staple of its plant. None of the company's success can be 
attributed to benefits from the Seaway project. 
The impact of plant slow downs like those experienced by 
Can Car and Portship were diverse and permeated the local 
economy. Besides contributing to the lay-offs of their own 
employees, these companies affected the businesses and 
employees of numerous sub-contractors supplying materials or 
expertise.”'^ For Portship, its long period of inaction 
affected its ability to fill future orders. By 1968, the 
company was having difficulty finding skilled labour since its 
labour pool had disappeared. Management was forced to hire 
140 men of "questionable skill" in order to fill a barge 
contract on time.*'^ 
In the case of both of these manufacturers, a large part 
of their problem was a lack of cheap transportation for their 
products. Their continued survival was based on their 
ability to adapt and tailor their operations to demand and to 
work around the disadvantages of their geographic location. 
To a certain extent, their situations could be considered 
worse case scenarios; both the materials for production and 
the prime consumers of their products were located in a 
Phillips Collection, MG-9 a-14. Presentation by R.E. 
Henderson to the Northwestern Ontario Business and Industrial 
Forum, 4 August 1964. 
Northwestern Ontario Development Association, Submission to 
the Royal Commission.... p.8. 
Kingston Shipyards Collection, Box 19. R.W. Sutton to W.A. 
Webster, " re:Port Arthur Shipbuilding", 28 June 1968. 
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distant market. Part of their survival strategy involved 
catering to the local market, specifically the forest 
industry. 
This disadvantage could partially explain the high 
mortality rate among local industry. As is evident from 
table 5.1, the number of manufacturing establishment declined 
significantly from 202 in 1960, to 110 by the end of the 
decade. This alarming figure of 92 closures is made worse by 
the fact that these yearly statistic would also have contained 
the 69 new manufacturing starts in the Lakehead during this 
period.**^ However, as the Dominion Bureau of Statistics 
also reported, some of these establishments were in the 
planning stages and may never have started production. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the Lakehead's level of 
production was down in comparison with the rest of the 
province. Table 5.1 shows that from 1960-1969, manufacturing 
activity at the Lakehead only increased 78 percent while the 
province as a whole increased almost 100 percent. 
This is corroborated by another report (table 5.2) done 
by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, which listed the 
industrial growth of all of the major communities in Canada 
and then compared their relative growth with that of the 
nation as a whole. As an indicator of growth, the number of 
manufacturing jobs were measured first at the beginning of the 
DBS, New Manufacturing Establishments in Canada (Ottawa: 
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1960's and then again ten years later. According to the 
Bureau, the number of manufacturing jobs at the Lakehead 
increased by 1,198 people or approximately 16.5 percent. 
While this is a modest increase, it is three percentage points 
below the national average. Moreover, when it is compared to 
the average of the province which was almost 25 percent, it is 
obvious that the manufacturing industries at the Lakehead 
received a disproportionate share of the decade's prosperity. 
Returning to table 5.1, it is interesting to note that 
while the number of establishments was declining, the number 
of people employed in the that sector was increasing. These 
figures reflect a concentration of the manufacturing process 
in a core group of operations which were able to survive 
changes in the economy and even to grow, supplying the lion's 
share of the sector employment. It also suggests that in all 
likelihood, it was these industries that accounted for most of 
the growth in the manufacturing industries. 
Who were these manufacturers? Outside of the usual 
number of bakeries, cabinet makers, and tailors, operations 
typically hiring three or four people, the largest industrial 
employer was the forest industry. Except for the occasional 
faltering of pulp and paper markets, the 1960's was a period 
of growth for almost all of the forest industry and it was 
this sector that became the driving force for industrial 
development in the Lakehead. Two of the four local mills 
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in the late 1950's representing a capital investment of 
approximately $3 7 millionGreat Lakes Forest Products, 
one of the two companies, attributed its expansion to a large 
extent, to its expectations of increased trade once the Seaway 
was complete. While the company expected not only to access 
larger markets and to take advantage of the improved 
transportation network, its faith was based also on an 
expansion of its existing markets. As the study of commodity 
movements has shown, the executives of Great Lakes appear to 
have had more realistic expectations of this development than 
did many of their contemporaries. 
The expansion of Great Lakes' facilities which started in 
1954 was an ambitious endeavour involving a 60 percent 
increase to the productive capacity of the mill. This was 
the largest expansion since the troubled period of the 1930's 
depression. Rated at 100,000 tons of newsprint per year in 
1928-29 the mill had improved the capacity of the existing 
machinery 55 percent during the 25 years which followed. With 
the expansion complete by 1955, adding a third paper machine 
to the mill. Great Lakes' management expected that the 
production level would reach about 245,000 tons or better per 
Great Lakes Paper estimated their expansion to cost about 
$15 million. Great Lakes Paper, 1955 Annual Report (Fort William, 
1955), p.l2; The expansion Abitibi Pulp and Paper, Fort William 
Mill was expected to have cost approximately $22 million. "Seaway 
will enhance Northwest Industrial Potential" Fort William Daily 
Times-Journal 26 March, 1957. 
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yearJ^ The entire project was slated to cost approximately 
$15 million. 
It is important to note that this expansion was not based 
simply on the company's ability to expand, nor on the 
expectation of increased demand. It was important that other 
factors, most importantly a supply of raw materials and power, 
were in place before the expansion took place. In both 
cases. Great Lakes needed the cooperation of the Ontario 
provincial government which controlled the use of the 
woodlands and produced the power needed to run the facilities. 
New licensing agreements with the provincial government 
guaranteed a supply of wood that would make this expansion 
viable. At the same time, the new facilities meant that the 
energy consumption from Ontario Hydro would almost double to 
73,000 horsepower from 37,000. 
Despite early expectations, Great Lakes' production level 
did not reach 250,000 tons per year until 1960, two years 
after the new paper machine began production. The company 
leaped away from the recession, however, to reach a record 
out-put of 374,672 tons of newsprint in 1966. In that same 
year, the company opened its expanded craft mill. Prior to 
this second major expansion. Great Lakes produced an average 
of 30,000 tons of chemical pulp for shipment. In the first 
Great Lakes Paper, 1955 Annual Report, p.7. 
Actually the mill bettered that figure for the year, 
producing 268,468 tons. Great Lakes Paper, 1968 Annual Report, 
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year of production, that level jumped to 89,000 tons, and it 
almost doubled from that figure to 168,000 tons by the end of 
the decade. In terms of dollar figures the new production 
capabilities translated into large profits. In 1957 and 
1958, the operating profit for Great Lakes Paper was 
$7,853,285 and $8,554,001 respectively; by 1969 that profit 
more than doubled to $17,951,000 or a record $75,226,000 in 
sales. 
The prosperity of the pulp and paper firms played a major 
role in the growth of the Lakehead during the 1960's. Of 
the seven large scale manufactures that located at the 
Lakehead, five of them chose the location expressly to serve 
this industry; three of them were chemical companies which 
produced various chemicals for the paper making process, 
another manufactured wire screens used to drain the pulp and 
the last built heavy machinery used in the woodlands.^® The 
establishment of these manufactures became very important to 
the Lakehead because it was losing its bid for industrial 
diversity. 
When one looks at the industrial expansion of the 
Lakehead during the first decade of the Seaway's operation, it 
becomes questionable if the project had any direct impact on 
the area. Few of the establishments that began production in 
These companies were Nichols Chemicals, Mid-Canada Chemical, 
Dow Chemical, West-Coast Wire, and Larson's Woodland's Research 
Ltd.. The other two establishments were Tee-Kay Apparel, a 
clothing manufacturer and the Lakehead Bag Company, which produced 
jute bags for the grain industry. 
117 
Port Arthur and Fort William during this period attributed 
their choice of location to the favourable position of the 
cities on the new Seaway route. In almost all cases, these 
companies were established to serve a specific sector of the 
local market, such as the Lakehead Bag Company, which produced 
bags for the grain industry. In fact, many of these 
establishments could also be classified as service industries, 
producing custom furniture, or parts to repair machinery in 
the region 
To a certain extent, the difficulty in attracting new 
industry to the Lakehead must be expected. Two years after 
the Seaway's completion, it had been established that the 
desired changes in the transportation costs had not appeared. 
The Northwestern Ontario Commission on Employment, as part of 
its mandate to monitor the employment situation at the 
Lakehead, concluded the size of the local market combined with 
the distance from large centres of demand and the high cost of 
transport were still major factors limiting the region's 
industrial growth. 
While it could be argued that, at the time of the 
Commission's publication in 1961, the Seaway had not been 
active long enough to have had a positive impact on the 
movement of general cargo, there is evidence to suggest that 
the situation did not improve by the end of the decade. In 
1970, the Ontario government completed a transportation impact 
Northwestern Ontario Commission on Employment, Op cit.. p.9. 
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study on Northwestern Ontario that was meant to establish what 
improvements were needed if the region was to expand into the 
next decade. It was concluded that, as the major 
distribution centre for the region, Thunder Bay would play a 
vital role in future development. The province was convinced 
of the potential of the Lakehead and the region for growth, as 
long as a system of transportation between Thunder Bay and 
Southern Ontario "would be developed so that the quality and 
price of transport services would not act as deterrent to 
traffic movements. Since the province did not have the 
power to affect the shipping industry, most of its 
recommendations involved the improvement of roads both within 
the region and connecting it with Southern Ontario, and the 
encouragement of programs that would attract industry to the 
Lakehead. 
It is rather obvious that because the St. Lawrence Seaway 
was unable to bring about a revolution in the movement of 
general cargo, its impact on the industrial sector of the 
Lakehead was largely non-existent. As the previous chapter 
illustrated, what business needed, low transportation costs 
for the means and yield of production, was a difficult goal 
owing to inefficiencies in the system and shippers' reluctance 
to change. As a result it was only in the movement of bulk 
Ontario, Department of Treasury and Economics, The 
Northwestern Ontario Region; A Transportation Impact Study. (Draft 
Final Report, 1970), part III-B, p.6. 
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goods that there could be any true expectation of price 
benefit. 
While the potential for bulk shipments having an impact 
on the growth of the Lakehead was limited compared to the 
movement of general cargo, it was in this important traffic 
that the communities of Port Arthur and Fort William found the 
largest benefit. Technically speaking, the major beneficiary 
of the transportation revolution in the movement of bulk 
cargo, went to the prairie farmer or the Quebec miner, as the 
major producers in the system. How the Lakehead profited 
from the Seaway project was through its 150 year old role as 
a transshipment point between East and West. In order to 
integrate this point into the new transport network took a 
large amount of capital; capital that would supply jobs and 
foster growth in another sector of the local economy. 
It was through regional improvements and integrating the 
harbour into the national transportation network that the 
Lakehead benefitted the most from the Seaway project. While 
the twin cities represented the extreme western terminus of 
the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway system, the area was, of 
course, not the end of the national transportation network. 
Improvements had to be made to both the harbour and the land 
systems to increase efficiency and to handle the rise in 
traffic westward. To that end, the harbour itself was 
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dredged, railway overpasses were built, highways improved and 
the storage capacity was increased. 
In order to handle the expected increase in grain 
shipments, a total of 15,682,000 bushels capacity was added to 
the harbour's grain elevators, bringing the total capacity to 
almost 105,000,000 bushels, reflecting a 16 percent 
increase.These expansions were estimated to represent a 
capital investment of approximately $15 million. In 
addition, the facilities needed by the terminals to load and 
unload grain were improved to handle the increased capacity 
more efficiently. This was especially important in loading 
ocean vessels, whose design was significantly different from 
the lake carriers. For example, in 1962, a modern loading 
gallery capable of accommodating the high level loading spouts 
of ocean vessels was added to the United Grain Growers of 
Alberta elevator.This new system had the ability to load 
a vessel at a rate of 25,000 tons or 1,000,000 bushels every 
Rather symbolically, the first step was to improve the 
administration of the two harbours through their amalgamation. 
First announced by George Hees, Minister of Transport, two years 
previous, the two harbours were privatized and came under the 
administration of a unified Harbour Commission in 1959 to coincide 
with the opening of the Seaway. Made up of five members, the 
commission was meant to control the traffic through the harbour, 
collect harbour fees and take care of its maintenance. 
J.E. Young, Op cit. 
Phillips Collection, MG-6, c-38. Observations on Future 
Employment Factors at the Canadian Lakehead. 
Phillips Collection, MG-6, c-52. R. B. Chandler, The St. 
Lawrence Seaway and the Lakehead Harbour: Canada's Mid-continental 
Seaport. 1962, p.27. 
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eight hours. A similar system was already in existence at 
the Lakehead Terminal Elevator, and was later added to 
Manitoba Pool no. 1 in 1962. Other systems that were added 
included an automatic rail-car dumper used by Saskatchewan 
Pool no. 7 which could unload 2 00 cars in an eight hour 
period. 
These capital investments and others, like the $8 million 
Keefer Terminal opened in 1962, and the $5 million Valley Camp 
Iron ore dock, opened in 1967, represented a substantial 
investment in the Lakehead's harbour facilities. These were 
combined with various subsidiary projects that were needed to 
complete the reform of the transportation network passing 
through Northwestern Ontario. These projects, such as road 
improvements, railway overpasses, new rail marshalling yards 
and the improvement of the trans-Canada highway resulted in a 
large influx of money into the region. The demand arising 
for building materials during this period of improvement 
helped to spur on the development of the local construction 
industry. Of the 60 new manufacturing establishments that 
came into existence during the period of expansion, a 
majority, 38 in all, were involved in the production of 
building materials. The industry also provided more 
employment than ever before. The 1961 census, taken at the 
Young, Op cit. 
DBS, New Manufacturing Establishments in Canada. (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1959-1970). 
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height of the construction boom, recorded a total of 2,894 
people employed in the construction industry, representing 8.5 
percent of the work force. Normally this industry's share of 
the work force was only 7.2 percent. It was even higher than 
the provincial average of 6.0 percent. 
The impact of the expansion and improvement of the 
existing transportation facilities went beyond the mere 
injection of funds into the economy and was to play a major 
role in the development of Port Arthur and Fort William's 
place as the regional metropole. The decade of the 1960's 
represents an evolution of the Lakehead's role in the life of 
the Northwestern Ontario, due mainly to the penetration of the 
region by an extensive system of roads to the various 
communities. Already, by 1959, service industries were 
beginning to play an increasingly important role in the 
economy of the communities. Whereas in 1951, the number of 
people employed in this sector accounted for 16 percent of the 
workforce, a total of 6,874 people, by 1961 the proportion had 
grown to 23 percent, or 12,144 people. This growth of course 
did not go unnoticed. Various local leaders commented on the 
increasing number of service related businesses being 
established, and their impact on the economy of the Lakehead 
at this time.^® It is doubtful, however, that they fully 
Census of Canada. (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1961). 
"But we are witnessing a greater and greater degree of 
diversification in employment by the influx of enterprises and 
establishments, like those already mentioned [distributive plants. 
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realized the potential for growth of this industry and the 
role it was eventually to play in the local economy. By the 
end of the decade, the employment in the sector grew by 11,742 
people, reflecting a 91 percent increase, placing it at 53 
percent of the total labour force.Compare this growth 
with that of the manufacturing or grain handling sector, which 
experienced an increase of only 1,198 and 302 people 
respectively. 
By the end of the decade these service related businesses 
had become an integral part of the health of the local 
economy, so much so that various government reports concerned 
with the region's economic health placed road construction and 
maintenance between centres, high on their list of projects 
important to the economic health of the region.The focus 
of effort was placed on improving what is known as "door to 
door" service, which would reduce transfer and shipment 
problems hampering the efficient movement of goods, in turn 
government establishments, amusement centres, regional retail 
stores, sales offices insurance and utility companies, restaurants, 
etc.]" Phillips Collection, MG-6, c-38. Alexander Phillips, A 
Paper - Observations on Future Employment Factors at the Canadian 
Lakehead. 
A total of 8342 new jobs were created in the service 
industry at the Lakehead during the 1960's. This out an increase 
of 12770 new employees in the community. DBS, Census of Canada 
1961; DBS, Census of Canada 1971. 
Ontario, Department of Treasury and Economics, The 
Northwestern Ontario Region; A Transportation Impact Study. (Draft 
Final Report, 1970), Part III-A, p. 7; Ontario, Department of 
Treasury and Economics.Design for Development; Northwestern Ontario 
Region Phase 2: Policy Recommendations. (Toronto: Department of 
Treasury and Economics, 1970), p.82. 
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helping to reduce shipment costs. Recommendations in this 
area covered all three transportation modes with the main 
emphasis being placed on the two competing in-land options, 
rail and truck transport. The nature of water transport 
precluded any real attempt of reforming the system since 
shippers choosing that mode did not have efficiency of 
transport as a major priority, insomuch as it affected 
shipment time. 
Conclusion 
For the communities of Northwestern Ontario, the search 
for economic stability had been an on-going challenge. Even 
for the Lakehead, the region's metropolitan centre whose 
economy was the most diverse of all of the region, the goal of 
sustained growth was never guaranteed. Both its location, 
away from Canada's prime sources of production and markets, 
and its small population, limiting its hinterland, played a 
major role in stunting, what might be thought of as a great 
potential for growth. Considering that much of the 
Lakehead's fortune was tied to the movement of goods between 
east and west, it is quite natural to assume that what was 
good for the transportation network was good for the Lakehead, 
especially if it promised to reduce the distance between it 
and its markets. This what the opening of the St. Lawrence 
Seaway promised. But in a sense, it promised more to the 
residents of Port Arthur and Fort William than making it 
easier and cheaper to ship the fruit of its labour; there was 
the chance that it could figuratively remove one of the major 
barriers to its future growth, the problem of its location. 
Major industry could be attracted to the region bringing with 
it more people, thereby removing the barriers to growth. 
For the residents of the Lakehead, this promise could not 
have come at a better time. A long period of prosperity, 
second only the growth sparked by the wheat boom, had suddenly 
come to an end, awakening the communities to the problems of 
an economy based on resource exploitation. The situation 
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became worse when it was realized that two other major 
employers, Can Car and Portship, which once supplied stable 
employment to a large sector of the local work force, had 
become victims of increased transportation costs and 
competition. A reduction of these costs could have 
significantly improved the economic situation of the 
community. 
Unfortunately, the promise was not realized. This study 
reveals that much of the anticipated benefits from the Seaway 
project, the general decline in water freight rates, the 
substantial increase in commodity traffic and physical 
improvements to the harbour, in actual fact had little direct 
impact on the Lakehead. The all important reduction in 
transportation costs only affected the movement of bulk cargo, 
cargo which was produced elsewhere and was merely transhipped 
just passing through the Lakehead. The Seaway project did 
have an some impact on the shipment of general cargo, enough 
to almost double its volume moving through the harbour, but 
not enough to improve its efficiency and reduce transportation 
costs. As a result, these costs remained a deterrent to 
industry locating in the region and reduced the 
competitiveness of the existing establishments. 
This is not to suggest that the twin cities did not 
profit from the Seaway project, but for the most part they 
were indirect benefits, such as the general prosperity that 
fuelled the economy or the lattice work of regional access 
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roads. It was both of these factors that influenced the shape 
of the local economy during the 1960's, leading to the 
concentration of the means of production in the forest 
industry and the phenomenal growth in the service industry. 
The few direct benefits were isolated primarily with the 
development of employment in freight handling or the initial 
construction projects improving the Lakehead's harbour 
facilities. The result was that local leaders had to turn to 
government for assistance programs to stimulate the needed 
industrial development, development that would have stabilized 
the regional economy and guaranteed growth. 
Was there a single reason why the Lakehead, considered to 
be at an advantageous location in the national transportation 
network, did not gain more from the St. Lawrence Seaway? . In 
one way, the answer is yes, but this factor was not anything 
that could have been corrected. The St. Lawrence Seaway can 
be seen to have been part of a general trend of change in the 
national economy. For business, the need for speed and 
efficiency had become paramount, while stockpiling and 
warehousing were slowly being phased out. In both cases, the 
proximity of markets and transportation efficiency became more 
important, in effect making the Lakehead more isolated from 








Marine Museum of the Great Lakes 
Canadian Steamship Lines Records. 
Kingston Shipyards Collection. 
Port Arthur Ship Building Collection. 
National Archives of Canada 
C.D. Howe Papers. 
Records of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority 
St. Lawrence Seaway Collection. 
Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society Archives 
Port Arthur Chamber of Commerce Collection. 
Fort William Chamber of Commerce Collection. 
Keefer Terminal File. 
Qoyernment Documents 
Canada, Canadian Minerals Yearbook. (Ottawa: Department of 
Energy Mines and Resources, 1964). 
Canada, Canadian Mineral Yearbook. (Ottawa: Department of 
Energy, Mines and Resources, 1967). 
Canada, Canadian Mineral Yearbook. (Ottawa: Department of 
Energy, Mines and Resources, 1970) . 
 , Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1958). 
 , Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1959). 
 / Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1960). 
129 
Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1961). 
./ Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1962). 
Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1963). 
, Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1964). 
/ Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1965). 
, Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1966). 
/ Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1967). 
, Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1968). 
, Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1969). 
, Canal Statistics. (Ottawa: Queens Printer,1970). 
,/ Census of Canada 1870-71. (Ottawa, Office of His 
Majesty's Printer, 1873). 
 , Census Of Canada 1880-81. (Ottawa, Office of His 
Majesty's Printer, 1882). 
 , Census of 1911. (Ottawa: Office of His Majesty's 
Printer, 1911). 
 , Census of Canada. 1921. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 
1921 
1932) . 
, Census of Canada, 1931. (Ottawa: Kings Printer, 
, Census of Canada. 1941. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 
1941) . 
 , Census of Canada (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1951). 
 , Census of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961). 
 , Census of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971). 
, Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
1958) . 
1959). 
, Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 




Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
1962) . 
,/ Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
1963) 
, Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
, Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
1964) . 
, Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
1965 . 
1966) 
, Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
, Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
1967) . 
, Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
1968) 
, Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
1969) . 
, Grain Trade of Canada (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
1970)  
, New Manufacturing Establishments in Canada 
(Ottawa:. Queen's Printer 1960-1969). 
, The Pulp and Paper Industry 1934. (Ottawa, Kings's 
Printer, 1936) 
 , Shipping Report. (Ottawa: His Majesty's Printer, 
1928-1936) . 
 , Shipping Report: Coastwise shipping vol.II (Ottawa: 
Queens Printer, 1961-70). 
 , Shipping Report: International Shipping vol. Ill 
(Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1961-70). 
, Statistics of the Economic Regions of Ontario and 
Quebec: A Progress Report. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 
1956). 
1949) 
, Trade of Canada: Exports. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports. (Ottawa: Queen' 
1950)  
 , Trade of Canada: Exports. (Ottawa: Queen' 
1951)  
 , Trade of Canada: Exports. 
1952) . 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports. 
1953) . 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports. 
1954) . 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports. 
1955) . 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports. 
1956) . 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports. 
1957)  
 , Trade of Canada: Exports. 
1958)  
 , Trade of Canada: Exports. 
1959)  




















 , Trade of Canada: Exports. (Ottawa: Queen' i 
1961). 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports bv CommoditY- 
Queen's Printer, 1962). 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports bv Commodity. 
Queen's Printer, 1963). 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports bv CommoditY- 
Queen's Printer, 1964). 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports bv Commodity. 
Queen's Printer, 1965). 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports bv Commodity. 
Queen's Printer, 1966). 





















Queen's Printer, 1967). 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports by Commodity. (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1968). 
 , Trade of Canada: Exports bv Commodity. (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1969). 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, His Majesties 
Printer, 1947) . 
Canada, Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure 
Accounts, 1926-1974. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1975). 
Ontario, Department of Lands and Forests, A History of Port 
Arthur Forest District: District History Series #4. 
(Toronto: Department of Lands and Forests, 1963). 
Ontario, Department of Treasury and Economics,Design for 
Development: Northwestern Ontario Region Phase 2: Policy 
Recommendations. (Toronto: Department of Treasury and 
Economics, 1970). 
 , The Northwestern Ontario Region; A Transportation 
Impact Study. (Draft Final Report, 1970), Addendum 3. 
Secondary Sources 
Arthur, Elizabeth, Thunder Bay District: 1821-1892. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1973). 
Careless, J.M.S, Frontier and Metropolis; Regions, Cities and 
Identies in Canada before 1914. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1989). 
Chevrier, Lionel The St. Lawrence Seaway. (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1959). 
Currie, A.W., Economics of Canadian Transportation. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1959). 
Henderson Directory: Twin Cities Fort William and Port Arthur. 
Vol.XV 1935. 
Inland Seas vol.43 #2 (summer 1987) pp.122-23. 
Innis, Harold, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to 
Canadian Economic History. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1956). 
International Deep Waterways Association, Proceedings of the 
133 
First Annual Convention of the International Deep 
Waterways Association. (Toronto: Hart & Riddell, 1895) . 
Larrain, Patricio, Port Geography of Thunder Bavi A Commodity 
Flow Analysis (Regina: Unpublished MA thesis, 1982) . 
McCalla, Douglas ed. Perspectives of Canadian Economic 
History. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1987), p.213. 
Mcllwraith, Thomas F., "Freight Capacity and Utilization of 
the Erie and Great Lakes Canals Before 1850" in The 
Journal of Economic History, vol.XXXVI #4. 
Nelles, H.V. The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and 
Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario. 1849-1941. (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1974). 
Nininger, J.R., Ontario Economic Council, A Survey of Changing 
Employment Patterns at the Lakehead Cities of Port Arthur 
and Fort William. (London: University of Western Ontario, 
1964) . 
Northwestern Ontario Commission on Employment, Report of the 
Commission. (Port Arthur: 1961). 
Phillips, Alexander, Annual report of the General Manager. 
(Northwestern Ontario Development Association, 1964) . 
Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society, Papers and Records., 
Vol.XI, (1983), pp.43-44. 
Trembley, David, How Great The Harvest Is. (Erin, Ontario: 
The Boston Mills Press, 1984), p.l20. 
Tucker, Gilbert, The Canadian Commercial Revolution. 1845- 
1851. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964) . 
Tulchinsky, Gerald, The River Barons: Montreal Business and 
Growth of Industry and Transportation, 1837-53. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1977). 
Young, J.E. Historical Facts. Grain Elevator Construction and 
Shipping: Lakehead Harbour. 1883-1964 (Port Arthur, 
Lakehead Harbour Commission, 1965). 
Newspapers 
The Financial Post. 
Fort William Daily Times Journal. 
134 
Pamphlets 
Fort William-Port Arthur and District Labour Council, Brief 
concerning the Serious Unemployment Situation in the Fort 
William-Port Arthur Areas. June 1960. 
Gibb, Underwood and McLellan Consulting Engineers, Keefer 
Lakehead Terminal Expansion: Lakehead Harbour 
Improvements. 1966. 
Great Lakes Paper Company, 1955 Annual Report, Expansion Issue 
1955-57. (Fort William: Great Lakes Paper Company, 1955) . 
 , Annual Report 1959 (Fort William, 1959) . 
 , 19 61 Annual Report (Fort William, 1961) . 
 , 1968 Annual Report. (Fort William, 1968). 
Great Lakes Waterways Development Association, A Detailed 
Study of Serious Problems Now Confronting All Users of 
the International St. Lawrence Seaway (Montreal-Lake 
Ontario) and All-Canadian Wetland Ship Canal (Toronto: 
1969). 
The Lakehead Chamber of Commerce and The Canadian Lakehead 
Industrial Commission Inc., The Canadian Lakehead. (Fort 
William). 
Thunder Bay Harbour Commission, Keefer Lakehead Terminal. 
Canada's Mid-Continent Seaport: Official Opening., 23 
June 1962. 
 , Port of Thunder Bay-Cargo Statistics 1989. 
Urban Transportation Development Corporation, Can Car Thunder 
Bay Works-1912-1990. 1990. 
Interviews 
Interview with Fred Miners 17 June, 1991. 
